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DIGEST 
This Issue Summary examines the financing of political campaigns in California over the 
past twenty years. The materials focus primarily upon state legislative elections which 
provide a large sample size and allow for generalizations across election cycles. Data 
from initiative campaigns and statewide elections are used to illustrate key points. This 
research was requested by Assembly Member Gwen Moore. 
There are four main variables of a campaign finance system: contribution limits, spending 
limits, public funding, and campaign finance disclosure. The paper is organized by these 
variables into seven component sections: 
• Contributions and Contribution Limits: This section examines fundraising patterns for 
political campaigns in California, provides data on the sources of contributions, 
suggests implications of current fundraising patterns, and evaluates the consequences 
ofvarious contribution limitations. 
• Expenditures and Spending Limits: This discussion analyzes the role of spending in 
California political campaigns, explores the cost of state legislative campaigns, 
examines the implications of current campaign spending practices, and assesses the 
consequences of expenditure limitations. 
• Public Financing: This section discusses the use of public funds for political 
campaigns, outlines the key components of public funding systems, and summarizes 
the debate over public financing. 
• Campaign Finance Disclosure: Finally, the paper explores the disclosure of campaign 
information in California, provides a brief history of disclosure provisions, and 
analyzes their effectiveness. 
• Campaign Finance Provisions in Selected Jurisdictions: These charts summarize 
campaign finance provisions in the United States and in several local jurisdictions, 
covering a wide spectrum of alternative campaign finance schemes. 
• Options: This section explores components of each of the above four variables, 
provides a range of alternatives for each, and examines some implications of 
implementing each option. 
• Appendices: The appendices provide detailed background information on campaign 
finance including: a history of reform efforts in California; a description of current 
California campaign finance reform legislation; and a series of historical charts 
detailing the raising and spending of money in California political campaigns. 
INTRODUCTION 
Elections are at the heart of representative government. Not only do they provide the 
formal means for transferring authority from the general populace to a small number of 
elected representatives, they provide a direct means for holding those representatives 
accountable. The legitimacy of representative institutions, then, depends in part on the 
legitimacy of the elections process. Furthermore, the importance of elections in California 
is increased by the integral role which the initiative process plays in public policy. 1 
Political campaigns serve a valuable role in the electoral process because candidates and 
other concerned individuals must be able to reach voters to communicate their messages 
and advocate for their candidacy or their cause. This communication is expensive and 
requires money, leading one scholar to assert, "campaign expenditures must be recognized 
as vital to the American way of choosing public officials. The expenditures are inherently 
neither good nor bad, neither high nor low. They are simply necessary. "2 While some 
democracies provide public funds to finance political campaigns, private contributions 
provide the only source of funds for California elections. 
A number of studies conducted during the past two decades support the assertion that 
campaign spending plays a critical role in legislative elections and initiative campaigns. 3 
This is not to say that the candidate who raises the most money will necessarily win. 
Other factors such as partisan affiliation, incumbency status, name recognition, ballot 
designation, and the impact of free media might have substantial effects on election results. 
Nonetheless, the ability to raise money is a threshold characteristic for serious challengers. 
It is important to point out that recent political reforms, such as the implementation of 
term limits on elected officials, may have a profound impact on the nature of political 
campaigns and the inherent advantages of incumbency. However, these effects may not be 
apparent for a number ofyears. 
Former Vice-President Hubert Humphrey once described political fundraising as a 
"curse ... the most disgusting, demeaning, disenchanting, debilitating experience of a 
politician's life. "4 While the process of raising money may be distasteful, candidates 
recognize that spending substantial sums of money makes them more competitive. Just to 
become viable, candidates must be willing to raise large amounts of money. The ability to 
stockpile huge war chests of campaign funds helps incumbents to ward off potentially 
troublesome challengers. 
California state legislative candidates raised and spent approximately $72 million during 
the 1991-1992 election cycle. Ballot measure committees raised and spent an additional 
$34 million during the 1992 elections. Spending in 1994 should well surpass this mark, as 
1 Cook and Simmons, 1994. 
2 Heard, 1962. 
3 See Jacobson; Gierzynski and Breaux; Owens and Wade; Magleby; and Lowenstein. 
4 New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission, 1989. 
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the election also includes statewide races and a number of high-profile initiative 
campatgns. 
Campaign-finance reform has been a contentious political issue in California since it first 
attracted public attention after the Watergate scandal. Despite numerous legislative 
proposals and citizen-sponsored initiatives designed to regulate the flow of money into 
political campaigns (See Appendix A), reform remains illusory. A series of highly 
publicized political scandals and state legislative political corruption trials involving 
campaign and personal payments have resulted in a measurable loss of public confidence in 
state political institutions, s further magnifying a need for reform. However, despite well 
documented public dissatisfaction with the current system of financing political 
campaigns, 6 there is neither consensus on whether campaign financing should be reformed, 
not how it should be reformed if it is. First Amendment protections on freedom of speech 
have been interpreted by the courts to include specific political activities, including raising 
and spending money for political office, thereby limiting public policy alternatives. In 
general, states have failed to develop clear or consistent standards for regulating campaign 
finance, providing for significant variation as detailed in Chart 32 (Page 48). 
Campaign finance reaches into the heart of the relationships between elected officials and 
their constituents, other citizens, political parties, interest groups, and other elected 
officials. The current system benefits some political actors and disadvantages others--it is 
not neutral, nor are alternative fundraising mechanisms. Thus, even slight alterations may 
have significant repercussions throughout the political system. Reforms would profoundly 
affect representative and power relationships. For example, while an objective of reform 
may be to encourage political participation by removing "big money" from the political 
system, this may diminish the amount of information available to citizens, and the quality 
of political dialogue, both of which are required to make informed electoral decisions. 
Insufficient political communication may discourage political participation, particularly 
among some electoral groups. 
Some commentators believe there is a fundamental tension between American egalitarian 
democratic ideals (as expressed in "one person, one vote,") and an unequal distribution of 
economic resources. This tension is exacerbated by the process of raising and spending 
private money for election to public office. Reformers have suggested mechanisms to 
"level the playing field" and strike a balance between these contending systems: 
contribution limits, expenditure limits, public financing, and disclosure requirements. 
Since the debate over campaign finance is fueled by fundamental values, alternatives are 
hotly contested and involve considerable trade-offs . 
. s The Field Institute, 1992. 
6 Center for Law in the Public Interest. 1992. 
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RAISING MONEY: CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONTRIBUTION LIMITS 
Who Contributes? 
When California voters overwhelmingly passed Proposition 9 in June 1974, they approved 
the most comprehensive campaign finance disclosure provisions in United States history. 
The Political Reform Act required all campaign committees receiving or spending $500 or 
more dollars to file a statement of organization with the Secretary of State and to file a 
series of reports detailing their financial activities. Candidates were required to complete 
periodic campaign disclosure reports identifying all contributors of $50 or more and each 
person or corporation to whom an expenditure of $50 or more was made. The measure 
was hailed at the time of its passage as a mechanism for ensuring that "public business (is) 
conducted openly and honestly-in public for all to see. "7 
However, twenty years later, it is clear that the disclosure provisions do not provide a 
timely and accurate reporting of campaign data. The last comprehensive study on the 
source of campaign contributions was conducted in 1985. Neither the Secretary of State 
nor the Fair Political Practices Commission issues comprehensive campaign finance 
reports (in part due to budget constraints). Without these reports, quantifying or even 
identifying the source of political contributions is a time-consuming task. One must go to 
the Secretary of State's office in Sacramento and request each of the individual candidate 
reports for the desired election cycle. These reports often exceed one hundred pages for 
statewide candidates and list thousands of entries without summarizing the data by source. 
Frequently, pages are missing or numbers do not add up, with no manageable way of 
checking the figures. So while the data are technically available to the public, the 
information is not compiled in a comprehensive manner for public consumption. As a 
practical matter, therefore, it is not useful. 
This report attempts to fill this information void by providing a comprehensive evaluation 
of the sources of campaign contributions. We coded over 81,000 separate contributions 
in amounts above $100 according to the name ofthe contributor and classified by source 
as individuals; political action committees, corporations and labor unions; partisan sources; 
and family sources•. We grouped P ACs, corporations, and labor unions together for the 
purpose of data analysis in order to analyze the contribution patterns of "special interests." 
Disaggregating the data would not further delineate the source of contributions because 
corporations and labor unions often establish P ACs to distribute money, as well as 
contributing directly to candidates and ballot measure committees from the organization. 
"Party and Transfers" includes political party contributions, transfer contributions from 
other candidates, and legislative-caucus contributions. Although there may be connections 
between some organizations and individuals, the data do not disclose that information. 
7 California Ballot Pamphlet. Primary Election 1974. 
• Capitol Weekly publishes contribution data from reports filed with the Secretary of State and is the 
source of this information. 
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California Legislative Contributions: Private organizations contributed nearly 2/3 of the 
contributions over $100 raised by California legislative candidates during the 1991-1992 
election cycle, while individuals gave just 17 percent. · 
Source of Contributions of $100 or More: 
California Legislative Candidates 1991-1992 
7% 
61% 
Source: California Research Bureau 
• Individuals 
IDI PACs. Business, and Labor 
0 Party and Transfers 
0 Family 
Chart 1 
The source of contributions varied somewhat between the California State Assembly and 
the State Senate. 
70% 
60% 
50% 
<40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
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By Legislative Seat Sought 1991-92 
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Business. 
and Labor 
Party and 
Transfers 
Source: California Research Bureau 
Family 
~ ~ 
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Differences between the chambers may be partially explained by several factors: 
• There are fewer Senators (40) than Assembly Members (80), giving each Senator's 
vote relatively more weight. P ACs, business, and labor may maximize their influence 
by contributing to Senators at a higher rate. In the 1992 election 23 Senate 
incumbents received $14 million and 58 Assembly incumbents received 
proportionately less, $23 million, from these sources. 
• Due to tight financial constraints, political parties and party leaders in the Legislature 
tend to direct their contributions to the most competitive races. During the 1991-92 
cycle, Assembly races were the most competitive elections. 
• Several candidates for the Senate contributed large amounts of personal funds to their 
own campaigns. 
Another important difference between the two chambers has to do with the vast 
fundraising difference between incumbents and non-incumbents. Although there were 
more than three times as many non-incumbents as incumbents seeking office, incumbents 
outraised non-incumbents by $54 million to $25 million in 1991-92. Assembly incumbents 
raised $34 million while Assembly non-incumbents raised $23 million. Senate incumbents 
raised $20 million while Senate non-incumbents raised just $2 million. 
Chart 3 shows the difference between the two chambers in the degree to which 
incumbents outraised their opponents. In order to account for the large number of non-
competitive challengers, this ratio is based on the amount of money raised by incumbents 
divided by the amount raised by their highest-raising challenger. Unopposed incumbents 
and incumbents whose opponents did not raise money are not included in this figure. 
Chart 3 
Incumbency Advanta re by Chamber 1991-928 
Average Amount Average Amount Incumbency 
Raised by Incumbents Raised by Challengers Advantage 
Assembly $335,887 $130,677 2.7 to 1 
Senate $405,163 $119,502 3.4 to 1 
The competitiveness of elections appears to be a key variable related to this incumbency 
fundraising advantage. Assembly elections were typically more competitive than Senate 
elections during the 1991-92 election cycle. However, even when controlling for the 
degree of competition, Senate incumbents enjoyed a wider fundraising advantage than 
their Assembly colleagues. Including only highly competitive elections (those in which 
the final vote margin was within ten percentage points) Senate incumbents outspent their 
highest-raising opponents by 2.6 to 1. Assembly incumbents outspent their opponents by 
1.6 to 1. 
The relative contributions of funding sources have varied over the last twelve years. 
8 California Secretary of State and California Research Bureau. 
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Chart 4 
Source: California Research Bureau and California Commission on Campaign Financing (1985) 
As Chart 4 demonstrates, the significance of partisan money in state legislative races is 
declining. Intra-party contributions reached their height (31 percent) in 1982. Just a 
decade later that proportion has fallen to 15 percent. Conversely, contributions from 
P ACs, corporations, and labor unions have increased proportionally during the same 
period. This finding appears to support a Council of State Governments study which 
attributes the national rise ofPACs to a general decline in the power of political parties.9 
Contributions from individuals (ranging from 13 percent to 17 percent) have shown the 
most consistency. Family contributions, including personal contributions to a candidate's 
own campaign, are becoming an increasingly important source of campaign funds. From 
1980 to 1992, the share of total contributions from families increased to nearly 1 0 percent. 
Small contributions of less than $100 from all sources comprised less than 5 percent of all 
contributions during the period surveyed. 10 
Initiative Contributions: Chart 5 shows that PAC, corporate, and labor contributions 
dominate initiative campaigns. Individual contributions to ballot measure committees 
comprised just 3 percent of all money raised to support or oppose 1992 propositions. In 
contrast, P ACs, business, and labor accounted for 82 percent of all funds raised. Party 
contributions and transfers (including political party contributions and contributions from 
elected officeholders) comprised 15 percent. 
9 Chi, "State Campaign Finance Reform: Options for the Future," 1993. 
10 Ruth Holton, testimony to Senate Committee on Elections and Reapportionment. October 28, 1993. 
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Source of Contributions of $100 or More: 
Ballot Measure Committees 1992 
Source: California Research Bureau 
• PACs. Business, and Labor 
• lndiviuls 
0 Party and Transfers 
UD Officeholders 
Chart 5 
In contrast, a study of the highest spending initiative campaigns found that P ACs, 
business, and labor supply almost 90 percent of the money used to support or oppose 
these ballot measures.l1 
Chart 6 
Source of Contributions of $100 or More: 
18 Highest-Spending Initiative Campaigns (1912-1992) 
• PACs. Business, and Labor 
• lndivic11als 
0 Party and Transfers 
UD Officeholders 
Source: California Commission on Campaign Financing Democracy by Initiative 
11 Ibid. 
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Charts 5 and 6 indicate that there is significant variation in the sources of contributions to 
ballot measure committees in 1992 and the highest spending initiative campaigns. This is 
primarily due to the content of the initiatives under consideration. For example, in 1992, 
elected officials played a more expansive role in financing initiative campaigns than is the 
norm. A large proportion ofthe $4.6 million contributed by state officeholders in 1992 
was to committees supporting or opposing Proposition 165, the Welfare and State Budget 
Initiative. Conversely, the highest-spending initiative campaigns typically involve issues 
critical to the business community. For example, in 1988, $80 million was spent to 
conduct campaigns favoring or opposing five insurance initiatives, the vast majority of 
which was contributed by the insurance industry, trial lawyers, and other political action 
committees and corporations. 12 Most likely, these initiatives would have garnered similar 
financial support or opposition regardless of the election year. 
Political Action Committees, Corporations, and Labor 
There are 1,640 PACs registered with the California Secretary of State and over 4,210 
federal P ACs recognized by the Federal Elections Commission. Their emergence is a 
relatively new phenomenon. PACs originated in the labor union movement of the 1940's 
in response to Congressional legislation which prohibited labor unions from spending 
organizational assets for political activities. (Corporations were prohibited from 
contributing corporate assets by legislation enacted earlier in the century. 13) The Congress 
oflndustrial Organizations created the "first American PAC" as a separate, segregated 
fund. 14 This organization, termed "The Political Action Committee" by the CIO, was 
designed to accept voluntary contributions and expend funds to further the union's 
political agenda. 
Other P ACs were created in the ensuing years, but real growth occurred in response to a 
series of federal reforms in the 1970's. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 
(FECA) was designed, in part, to restrict the role of large "fat cat" individual contributors 
in federal elections. The Act prohibited individuals from contributing in excess of$1,000 
per candidate per election, up to an aggregate of$25,000 per calendar year. Multi-
candidate political committees (organizations receiving contributions from a number of 
diverse sources and contributing to more than one candidate) faced less restrictive 
regulations: contribution limits of $5,000 per candidate per election and no aggregate 
contribution limit. FECA also overturned a Hatch Act provision which prohibited 
corporations and labor unions with federal contracts from creating P ACs. These 
provisions fueled the growth ofPACs. 
Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court held in Buckley v. Valeo that FECA's 
limitations on independent expenditures violated First Amendment protections. 15 The 
ruling prohibited restrictions on the ability of individuals or committees to independently 
12 California Commission on Campaign Financing, 1992. 
13 Sorauf, 1990. 
14 Ibid. 
IS Buckley v. Va/eo, 1976. 
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promote candidates or advocate positions. This further enhanced the potential power of 
P ACs because they are typically the only non-party org~tions sufficiently organized to 
conduct independent expenditure campaigns. In 1975 the Federal Elections Commission 
opined that Sun Oil's corporate PAC could use corporate funds to solicit voluntary 
contributions from employees. 16 This decision cleared the way for a variety of fundraising 
activities and encouraged labor unions and corporations to create P ACs to serve as their 
political advocacy arms. As Frank Sorauf notes, "virtually every major change in the 
regulation of campaign finance that Congress enacted in the 1970's spurred the growth of 
PACs."t7 
P ACs tend to cluster around either ideological or economic interests. 
• Ideological P ACs are generally organized around either broad-based philosophical 
beliefs or single policy issues. They typically contribute to candidates sympathetic to 
their positions, regardless of party affiliation or incumbency status. The National Rifle 
Association and Handgun Control PAC are examples of ideological committees. 
• Economic P ACs include corporate, labor union, and professional and trade association 
committees. Examples include Phillip Morris PAC, AFL-CIO P ACs, and the 
California Medical Association PAC. They have a different pattern of contributions. 
A recent study found that economic P ACs are primarily concerned with gaining access 
to the political process, and therefore tend to favor incumbents over non-incumbents 
regardless of ideology. 18 Unlike ideological PACs, which often support a single 
candidate in open seat contests, economic P ACs prefer to hedge their bets. They 
contribute to each of the major candidates in highly competitive open seat elections to 
ensure that they have supported the eventual winner. Further, an incumbent's voting 
record is the key factor that P ACs consider in determining how much to contribute 
and to which candidates. 19 
Chart 7 shows that state legislative incumbents received almost twice as much of their 
funds from P ACs, business, and labor than did non-incumbents during the 1991-92 
election cycle (71 percent to 38 percent). While challengers received a plurality of their 
funds from political action committees, individual and party contributions, partisan 
transfers, and personal and fanuly contributions comprised a significant portion of their 
funds. 
16 Alexander, 1992. 
17 Sorauf, 1990. 
18 King and Robin, 1989. 
19 Ibid. 
CRB-IS-006 
July, 1994 
Page 10 of61 
Sources of Contributions of $100 or More: 
Non-Incumbents 1991-92 
Party and Transfers 
23% 
PACs, Business, and 
Labor38% 
Incumbents 1991-92 
Party and Transfers Family 2% 
12% 
PACs, Busir-, and 
Labor71% 
Source: California Research Bureau 
Chart 7 
According to a California Common Cause report, the ten largest contributors to state 
legislative candidates accounted for a combined ten percent of the total money raised 
during the 1991-92 state legislative election cycle ($7.7 million). Nine of these ten are 
"economic" PACs: California Medical Association PAC, California Correctional Peace 
Officer Association PAC, California Teachers Association PAC, California Trial Lawyers' 
PAC, California Real Estate PAC, Association of California Insurance Companies' PAC, 
Atlantic Richfield Company PAC, California Dental Association PAC, and California 
Optometric Association PAC. Allied Business PAC, the ninth-largest contributor, is an 
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ideological PAC. Incumbents received 59 percent ofthese contributions, while open seat 
candidates received 31 percent and challengers 10 percent. 20 In contrast, incumbents 
received 92 percent of the money contributed by the top ten contributors in 1990.21 The 
difference between the two election years might have been due to the large number of 
open Assembly seats (24) in 1992. 
Although there were over three times as many non-incumbents as incumbents seeking 
election in 1992, Chart 8 indicates that incumbents received 80 percent of the 
contributions from P ACs, corporations, and labor unions. 22 
PAC, Corporate, and Labor Contributions to 
State Legislative Candidates 1991-92 
m lnrumberts (82) 
Chart 8 
• Non-Incumbents (251) 
Source: California Research Bureau 
The existence of highly-contested open-seat elections appears to affect the proportion of 
political action committee, corporate, and labor union contributions received by non-
incumbents and incumbents. Chart 9 shows that Assembly non-incumbents received a 
greater share of these contributions than Senate non-incumbents. On average, incumbents 
received 97 percent ofthe Senate contributions from these sources in 1991-92.23 There 
were no open-seat Senate elections. In contrast, there were 24 open Assembly seats 
incumbents garnered 91 percent of the PAC, corporate, and labor contributions to state 
Assembly candidates. 
20 California Common Cause Deep Pockets. 1993. 
21 California Common Cause, 1992. 
22 See Appendix G for total contributions to California State Legislative candidates by source and 
incumbency status for 1991-92. 
23 The data used for Chart 9 were adjusted to account for the far larger proportion of non-incumbents 
seeking election to the Assembly than the Senate. 
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Chart 9 
PAC, Corporate, and Labor Contributions to 
State Legislative Candidates per Candidate 1991-1992 
Senate Assembly 
Some analysts argue that the reliance of legislative candidates on PAC, corporate, and 
labor contributions might compel these candidates to cultivate a "twin constituency," an 
electoral constituency and a financial one. The paradox is that candidates need to secure 
the votes of their constituents to be elected, yet they seek money from outside their 
district to encourage that support. The California Commission on Campaign Financing 
found in 1985 that 92 percent of all contributions to state legislative candidates originated 
outside the legislators' districts. Dual constituencies may lead to a more complicated 
representative relationship between an elected official and the general public. "The two 
constituencies do not always have the same preferences on issues of public policy ... 
conflicting pressures in both the campaign and in public office follow. "24 
This phenomenon is a relatively new one. For much of American democratic history, 
powerful political parties composed of broad coalitions of multiple cross-cutting interests 
predominated and prevented this overlapping. "The electoral and resource constituencies 
were congruent. Both were rooted in the localism of the geographically defined voting 
constituency and in the matching units of party organization. "2S However, the influence of 
political parties on legislative races is on the decline, as evidenced by declining 
percentages of campaign contributions (Chart 4). Still, the development of dual 
constituencies is not inherently problematic. Studies of Congressional behavior show that 
"personal philosophy, party loyalty, and an aversion to offending voters are more 
influential factors than campaign contributions in determining positions taken by members 
of Congress. "26 A recent study of the California Legislature found that "for both business 
and labor interests, neither the number nor the monetary amount of campaign 
contributions to incumbents are found to have a major influence on legislative roll call 
voting. "27 However, the study notes that there may be critical issues for which a 
contributor's specific interest assumes greater importance than a dispersed district interest. 
24 Sorauf, 1990. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Jacobson. 1978. 
27 Dow and Endersby, 1994. 
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Individuals 
Individuals typically give the largest proportion of contributions in state legislative 
elections throughout the United States. In addition, candidates for Congress raised 
between 60 and 70 percent of their funds from individuals throughout the past decade. In 
California, however, individual contributors play a less prevalent role than in other states 
or for all of Congress. During the 1991-92 election cycle, individual contributions 
comprised just 17 percent of the total amount raised by state legislative candidates. 
Individuals may contribute money because of ideological or public-policy reasons, the 
perceived opportunity to improve their financial situation, or for social reasons. For 
example, "many people donate money to political campaigns simply because they are 
asked to make a contribution. Other individuals contribute to campaigns out of a sense of 
civic duty or because they sympathize with a particular candidate or cause that is being 
advocated. "28 While individuals contribute for a variety of reasons, a recent study found 
that these individuals have much in common with each other. Typical campaign 
contributors are "a highly elite politicized stratum of the electorate (for whom) political 
contribution is a repetitive and perhaps cumulative behavior. "29 
Although there were over three times as many non-incumbents as incumbents seeking 
election in 1992, incumbents received 58 percent of contributions from individuals. 
Individual Contributions to 
State Legislative Candidates 1991-92 
42% 
m lncumberts (82) 
Chart 10 
• Non-Incumbents (251) 
28 Sorauf, 1992. 
29 Jones and Hopkins, 1985. 
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Disaggregating the data yields a different result for the Senate and Assembly. Once again, 
highly competitive open-seat races appear to be a key variable. Non-incumbents received 
15 percent ofthe Senate individual contributions in 1991-92, while non-incumbents 
received 21 percent of Assembly individual contributions. 30 
Chart 11 
Individual Contributions to State Legislative Candidates 
per Candidate 1991-1992 
Senate Assembly 
...... C' .... 
--
These figures may understate the role of individual contributions. Some individuals do not 
contribute directly to candidates because they feel that their contributions would just be a 
small drop in a very large bucket.31 Instead, they pool their money, and their political 
influence, by contributing to political parties, P ACs, or trade associations and labor 
unions, who "bundle" these contributions and pass them on in larger sums to candidates. 
So while direct individual contributions comprised just 17 percent of state legislative 
campaign contributions in 1991-92, individuals actually played a more significant role by 
contributing to political parties, P ACs, and other committees. 
Political Party Contributions and Transfers 
Party organizations were the third largest source of state legislative campaign funds in 
1991-92 ( 15 percent). These include direct political-party contributions, transfer 
contributions from other candidates or officeholders, and legislative-caucus contributions. 
While the proportion of contributions from these sources is relatively small, party 
contributions can have an important impact on the outcomes of targeted campaigns. 
Rather than distributing small sums to a large number of candidates, partisan sources 
typically target a small number of particularly close races and inject large sums of money 
at critical points in the election. The average partisan contribution in 1992 was in excess 
of $17,000. Also, political parties contribute more to political campaigns than the $7 
million of direct contributions reported by candidates in 1992. Much of this is in the form 
of "soft money" expenditures which candidates do not report. "Soft money" expenditures 
include voter registration campaigns, get out the vote efforts, and other activities designed 
. 
30 The data used for Chart 11 were adjusted to account for the far larger proportion of non-incumbents 
seeking election to the Assembly than the Senate. 
31 Jacobson. 1980. 
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to assist targeted candidates while simultaneously promoting the party. Since "soft 
money" is not subject to the same disclosure requirements as direct contributions, it is 
difficult to know whether parties have increased these activities as their share of direct 
contributions has waned. 
The California Commission on Campaign Financing found that officeholder transfers and 
legislative caucus contributions provided 23 percent of all funds contributed to legislative 
candidates during 1983-84, while political parties provided nearly 5 percent of funds 
raised. 32 In 1992, the share provided by political parties increased to 9 percent, while 
transfers and legislative caucus contributions fell to just 6 percent. 
Political parties support the party nominee in close general elections, regardless of 
incumbency status. In 1992, political-party contributions went to non-incumbents in 
higher rates, on average, than officeholder transfers and legislative caucus contributions 
which tend to support incumbents who are part of the gove.rning party organization in the 
Legislature. Legislative leaders of both parties are generally responsible for generating 
and dispensing these legislatively generated funds. 
Although there were over three times as many non-incumbents as incumbents seeking 
election in 1992, incumbents received 52 percent of contributions from political parties 
and partisan transfers. 
Political Party Contributions and Transfers to 
State Legislative Candidates 1991-92 
48% m ll'lQ.Imberis (82) 
Chart 12 
• Non-ll'lQ.Imbents (251) 
Source: California Research Bureau 
Chart 13 details differences between the two legislative chambers. Assembly seats were 
far more competitive than were the Senate races in 1991-92 and one quarter of the 
32 California Commission on Campaign Financing, 1985. 
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partisan Assembly contributions were distributed to non-incumbents. In contrast, 15 
percent of the partisan contributions to Senate candidates were made to incumbents. 33 
Chart 13 
Political Party Contributions and Transfers to 
State Legislative Candidates per Candidate 1991-1992 
Senate Assembly 
Personal Sources 
Family and personal campaign contributions comprised the smallest portion of funds raised 
by state legislative candidates during the 1992 election cycle (7 percent). Several 
independently wealthy candidates contributed large amounts of their own funds to their 
campaigns. In 1992, the average personal contribution was in excess of$23,000, 
including a single contribution of nearly $800,000 by an incumbent running for the Senate. 
Personal contributions have a more substantial impact on individual legislative outcomes 
than their relatively small proportion would suggest. Wealthy candidates tend to 
contribute their own funds in substantial amounts when they are engaged in competitive 
elections and often do so during critical points in the campaign. 
Personal campaign contributions are the only category of contributions in which non-
incumbents have an advantage. In 1992, non-incumbents received $4.2 million of the $5.5 
million contributed by family sources. This "advantage" is somewhat dubious~ the use of 
personal wealth may signify an inability to raise sufficient funds from other sources. 
Money contributed by a candidate to his or her campaign may not be regulated by state or 
federal laws. The United States Supreme Court ruled in Buckley v. Valeo that limitations 
on candidates' expenditures of personal funds, and restrictions on independent 
expenditures, are unconstitutional because "those provisions place substantial and direct 
restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected 
political expression. "34 Candidates must voluntarily agree to limit the use of personal 
wealth, as any statutory limitations would be ruled unconstitutional. Some states require 
candidates receiving public funding to voluntarily limit their personal contributions. 
33 The data used for Chart 13 were adjusted to account for the far larger proportion of non-incumbents 
seeking election to the Assembly than the Senate. 
34 Buckley v. Valeo, 1976. 
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The use of personal wealth in California elections is increasing markedly. In 1982, two 
Senate candidates and twelve Assembly candidates donated more than $20,000 each to 
their legislative campaigns. Figures for the 1984 election were similar.3s However, seven 
Senate candidates and twenty-four Assembly candidates surpassed the $30,000 mark in 
1992,36 including four Senate candidates and six Assembly candidates who contributed 
over $100,000. This trend is continuing among both legislative and statewide candidates 
in the current election cycle: three gubernatorial candidates were expected to contribute 
over $1 million to their own campaigns during the primary alone. 37 
The ability to raise funds has long been considered a threshold characteristic for potentially 
competitive challengers. It is an advantage to be able to spend considerable amounts of 
one's own money, especially during an economic recession when other contributions are 
more difficult to secure. "The result: lesser income candidates who can't match 
personally-funded million dollar campaigns are increasingly nudged out of the process. "38 
Although personal wealth may make legislators "a bit more independent" it may also make 
them "a bit more impervious to legitimate constituent pressures" and consequently less 
accountable to voters. 39 
Chart 14 
Personal and Family Contributions to 
State Legislative Candidates per Candidate 1991-92 
m lncumberts (82) 
• Non-lncumbents(251) 
Source: California Research Bureau 
Chart 15 indicates that there was significant variation between the two legislative 
chambers during the 1992 election cycle. Because candidates are unlikely to expend large 
sums of their own money in non-competitive races, the fact that Assembly seats were far 
3S California Commission on Campaign Financing, 1985. 
36 Adjusted for inflation, a $20,000 expenditure is equal to a $29,928 expenditure in 1992. 
37 Hayward, April24, 1994. 
38fuid. 
39 David Canon, quoted in Simpson, 1993. 
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more competitive than were the Senate races might be responsible for this difference. 
While non-incumbents received just over half of the Senate family contributions, non-
incumbents garnered nearly 70 percent of Assembly family contributions. 40 
Chart 15 
Personal Contributions to 
State Legislative Candidates per Candidate 1991-1992 
Senate Assembly 
.... =··· --
Implications of Campaign Fund raising Patterns 
Corruption or the Appearance of Co"uption 
During the 1992 election cycle, California legislative candidates raised almost 75 percent 
oftheir campaign funds ($58.6 million) in contributions in excess of$1,000. In addition, 
Chart 16 indicates that large contributors have also played an important role in the 
financing of initiative campaigns. 
Chart 16 
Contributions to Ballot Measure Committees 
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• 1992 Ballot Measuru 
0 1990 Ballot Meaauru 
1.\\1 Top 18 Ballot Measure• 
Source: California Research Bureau and California Commission on Campaign Financing 
40 The data used for Chart 15 were adjusted to account for the far larger proportion of non-incumbents 
seeking election to the Assembly than the Senate. 
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Dependence on large contributors, especially P ACs, has led to allegations that campaign 
contributions distort the political process by providing contributors with disproportionate 
access to decision-makers and possible favorable treatment; or at least consideration, on 
certain legislative matters. Some commentators blame the proliferation of large 
contributors for the loss of public confidence in government and for governmental 
"gridlock." Other analysts have argued that interest groups are critical representational 
instruments in a pluralistic society. Interest groups organize individuals and voice group 
preferences. Their membership gains the attention of governmental decision-makers and 
provides important and valued information to the legislative process. The large number of 
identifiable interests might ensure that these groups will be constantly competing with one 
another, thereby preventing one interest from predominating in highly visible policy 
decisions. One interest might, however, dominate a narrow policy arena. 
Some public opinion polls have shown that the public generally believes that "most state 
legislators are for sale to their largest campaign contributors." A 1990 Los Angeles Times 
Poll found that nearly 70 percent of those surveyed believed that "state government is 
pretty much run by a few big interests (and not) for the benefit of all the people ... members 
are too tied to special interests through campaign contributions. "41 The poll, which was 
conducted prior to a series of widely reported corruption investigations and the conviction 
of several former legislators, also found that 53 percent of those surveyed thought that 
"taking bribes is a relatively common practice" of California lawmakers.42 
Incumbency Advantage 
Incumbents have a substantial advantage over non-incumbents in raising campaign funds. 
As Chart 3 indicated, on average incumbents outraised their challengers by a three to one 
margin in the 1992 state legislative elections despite an unprecedented number of open 
seats and electoral competition resulting from legislative redistricting. The re-election rate 
of California legislators in the 1990's is over 95 percent. 
Individuals or groups seeking access to the political process probably contribute campaign 
funds to incumbents at much higher rates since incumbents are more likely to defeat their 
challengers. Furthermore, incumbents have a broader financial constituency to draw upon 
than non-incumbents. Although there were three times as many non-incumbents as 
incumbents in 1992, incumbents received over 55,000 separate contributions, while non-
incumbents received 33,000. Even after term limits take effect, incumbents will most 
likely have adequate time to develop broad financial bases. 
Incumbents also have the advantage of being able to raise funds during non-election years. 
While non-incumbents are not precluded from raising money in the years prior to an 
election, they typically declare their candidacies and begin raising money in January of the 
election year. This gives Senate incumbents a three-year advantage, and Assembly 
incumbents a one-year advantage over their challengers. Incumbents received 99 percent 
41 Skelton, January 3, 1990. 
421bid. 
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of$19.5 million raised by legislative candidates in 1991 (a non-election year).43 However, 
the incumbency advantage may be overstated. While incumbents have an advantage in 
raising money, studies show they have a disadvantage in the electoral impact of spending 
that money. This point will be examined in more detail in the following section. 
Contribution Limits 
Contribution limits are designed to eliminate corruption, or the appearance of corruption, 
from the political process by restricting the financial influence of individuals or 
organizations who might otherwise contribute disproportionately large sums of money to 
political candidates. Contribution limits are also intended to assist non-incumbents in 
competing on a more equitable basis against incumbents. Finally, contribution limits are 
meant to reduce the amount of money spent in political campaigns. 
Forty-two states currently limit the amounts of money that specified contributors may give 
to statewide and state legislative candidates. State laws vary based on the categories of 
contributors who are limited, and the amount of the maximum contributions. Chart 16 
details the number of states that limit specified categories of contributions. 
Chart 16 
State Limitations and Prohibitions on Contributions 
By Source 
Corporations Labor Unions PACs Regulated Individuals 
Industries 
Contribution Umlted 
Source: The Council of State Governments 
Partisan 
Sources 
Anonymous 
The 1990 California election was conducted under Proposition 73 contribution limits. 
Unfortunately, computerized campaign finance data services did not gather campaign 
finance figures from that election in a format conducive to a comprehensive analysis. 
However, experience indicates that contribution limits serve as both a ceiling and as a 
43 California Common Cause The Price of Admission, 1993. 
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floor for large contributors. For example, if contribution limits are set at $1000 per 
candidate per election cycle,44 contributors who previously .contributed in excess of 
$1,000 will instead contribute the maximum amount. Additionally, contributors who 
previously gave moderately less than $1,000 will tend to contribute the maximum amount. 
Thus, contribution limits tend to increase some contributions while decreasing others. 
Eliminate Co"uption!Appearance of Co"uption 
Large contributors played an important role in the 1992 state legislative and state ballot-
measure elections. Contribution limits might have dramatically altered contribution 
patterns. For example, if$1,000 limits had been in effect for all contributors (excluding 
First Amendment-protected personal sources) during the 1992 elections, individual and 
personal contributions would probably have increased as a proportion of all contributions 
while PAC and partisan contributions would have significantly declined, as shown below. 45 
Projected Sources of Contributions 
With $1,000 Contribution Limits (1992) 
• lndivickJal& 
Chart 17 
1DJ PAC&, Business, and Labor 
• Partisan Sources 
0 Family 
Source: California Research Bureau 
Contribution limitations can be broadly tailored to yield different contribution patterns. 
Chart 17 shows the projected sources of contributions with $1,000 limits for all sources, 
but different outcomes can be achieved by altering the maximum contributions. For 
example, because individuals and political parties tend to contribute more equally to non-
incumbents than P ACs, setting individual contribution limits at high levels might benefit 
challengers. Increasing individual and party contributions is a frequent reform objective. 
Other mechanisms may achieve similar results. Recent studies suggest that offering 
44 A $1,000 limit is typical for states with contribution limits. 
45 Family and personal contributions are exempt from these limits due to Buckley v. Va/eo. 
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substantial tax credits, providing public matching funds, or increasing the number of 
legislative districts might also promote individual contributions. 
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo permits contributors to 
make unlimited independent expenditures on behalf of candidates46• The Buckley decision 
ensures that individuals or groups can participate as heavily as they desire in campaigns 
provided that their expenditures are not coordinated with a candidate's campaign. The 
California Commission on Campaign Financing asserted in 1985 that independent 
expenditures would not be widely used in California because independent campaigns are 
"difficult to organize, expensive to operate, and unlikely to coalesce around legislative 
races."47 However, that assertion has proven to be incorrect. Chart 19 shows that during 
the 1990 election cycle, independent expenditures grew markedly, perhaps as a response 
to Proposition 73's direct contribution limits. In 1991-92, after Proposition 73 had been 
struck down by the federal court, independent expenditures decreased. This suggests that 
contribution limits may re-direct, rather than limit, financial participation in state political 
campaigns. The public might prefer that candidates directly control their campaigns rather 
than encourage others to independently campaign on the candidates' behalves. 
Chart 18 
Independent Expenditures 
On Behalf of State Legislative Candidates 
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Arizona's experience also suggests that a possible unintended consequence of contribution 
limits may be an increase in independent expenditures. Arizona has the strictest 
contribution limits in the country, $240 per candidate per election for individuals and 
political committees. "With contribution limits so low, you'd think that no legislator 
46 Expenditures on behalf of candidates exclude contributions to candidates. 
47 California Commission on Campaign Financing, 1985. 
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would feel a debt to any individual donor. You would, of course, be wrong ... political 
committees don't sit still once they've given all they can to candidates ... some mount 
independent expenditure campaigns. "48 Few political coll1ll1ittees or individuals initiate 
campaigns on behalf of a candidate due to the expense and organizational difficulty. 
However, when independent expenditures are made, they tend to be for large items such 
as mass mailings or advertising. In 1990, the average independent expenditure for 
California state legislative races was $13,400, including numerous expenditures over 
$100,000. These expenditures are especially controversial because, unlike candidates, 
independent-expenditure committees are not accountable to voters for their campaign 
activities. Nor are state disclosure standards as strict for independent expenditures as for 
contributions to and expenditures by candidates. 
The dilemma raised by First Amendment protections is significant: "The problem in 
campaign finance is that we want completely clean elections with no tainted money, and 
we want full and unfettered rights of free speech and association. You cannot have both. 
If you're not going to tinker with the First Amendment, you have to accept the fact that 
you can't dam the flow of political money."49 
Courts have also cited First Amendment protections when invalidating limitations on 
contributions to ballot-measure committees. The Buckley decision established a precedent 
by requiring that any infringements on political activities be directly related to preventing 
corruption of candidates or the political process. In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, that "the risk of corruption perceived 
in cases involving candidate elections simply is not present in a popular vote on a public 
issue. "5° However, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990), the Court 
expanded allowable justifications for restrictions on speech to include activities which may 
"undermine the integrity of the political process (and) influence unfairly the outcome of 
elections."51 This latter decision may be invoked to justify limits on contributions to 
ballot-measure committees in the future. 
Incumbency Advantage 
Since incumbents receive a disproportionate share of political action committee, 
corporate, and labor contributions, contribution limits theoretically could mitigate the 
incumbent fundraising advantage. However, recent experience indicates that contribution 
limits by themselves actually favor incumbents. California Common Cause reports that in 
1988 and 1992 (elections with no contribution limits) state legislative incumbents 
outraised their challengers by a five to one margin. When contribution limits were in 
effect in 1990, incumbents outraised their challengers by eight to one. 52 Analysis of data 
48 Gurwitt, 1992. 
49 Professor Larry Sabato quoted in Gurwitt, 1992. 
so Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 1982. 
51 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 1990. 
S2 California Common Cause The Price of Admission. 1993. Common Cause uses a different method for 
determining incumbency fundraising advantages than the one described on page 6. 
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from the 1992 election cycle suggests that incumbents would have benefited from $1,000 
contribution limits on political committees, individuals, and partisan sources. 
Incumbents benefit from contribution limits in three ways. First, non-incumbents 
disproportionately rely on a few large contributions while incumbents typically draw from 
a wider financial base. Second, because incumbents have more time than non-incumbents 
to raise money, incumbents find it far easier to attract new contributors. Third, if spending 
is reduced by all candidates, incumbents benefit. As Gary Jacobson explains, "any reform 
measure which decreases spending by the candidates will favor incumbents. Even though 
incumbents raise money more easily from all sources, limits on contributions will not help 
challengers because the problem is ... simply getting more money to challengers so that they 
can mount competitive races. Anything that makes it harder to raise campaign funds is to 
their detriment. 53" In order to be effective and in compliance with the United States 
Constitution, contribution limits must strike a balance between the goal of limiting the 
amount of contributions and the need of non-incumbents to raise a sufficient amount of 
money to compete more equitably. 
Reduce Spending 
Legislative candidates spent $76 million in 1987-88 and $72 million in 1991-92, but just 
$54 million under Proposition 73 limitations during the 1989-90 election cycle. 54 It is not 
clear if contribution limits were responsible for this decrease in electoral spending. The 
Fair Political Practices Commission suggests that "Proposition 73 may have been a factor 
in decreased legislative campaign finance levels (however) the impact of ballot measures 
on candidate fundraising is another factor to consider. In particular, the primary election 
reapportionment initiatives and general election term limit initiatives may have diverted 
campaign funds which would have otherwise been used in legislative contests. "55 
While aggregate spending decreased during the 1990 elections, large sums were spent in 
some legislative contests. Seven Senate candidates spent over $350,000 each in the 
general election and twelve spent over $250,000 each in the primary elections. In contrast, 
in the 1992 general election, just five Senate candidates spent in excess of $350,000 each 
and ten spent over $250,000 each in the primary. Twenty Assembly candidates exceeded 
$225,000 each in the general and sixty-two spent over $150,000 each in the primary in 
1990. Two years later,jorty-three candidates spent over $225,000 each in the general, 
but just eighteen spent over $150,000 each in the primary. 
Furthermore, while strict contribution limits have been in place for congressional elections 
since 1974, these "did not prevent campaign spending in those races from escalating 
throughout the late 1970's and most ofthe 1980's."56 The 1994 U.S. Senate contest in 
California is a prime example of large campaign spending in spite of contribution limits. 
53 Jacobson. 1980. 
54 Fair Political Practices Commission. 1991. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Alexander, 1991. 
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Although contribution limits might limit the amount of money candidates spend, the 
overall effect is nearly impossible to estimate because the Buckley decision prohibits 
restrictions on the use of personal wealth and independent expenditure campaigns. One 
analyst contends that, "donors and candidates all across the country have shown an 
endless inventiveness in getting around contribution limits. "57 
S7 Gunvitt, 1992. 
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SPENDING MONEY: EXPENDITURES AND SPENDING LIMITS 
Candidates spend a large amount of money on their campaigns because expenditures have 
a significant impact on election results. In the 1992 general state legislative elections, 
legislative candidates who outspent their opponents were victorious 94 percent of the 
time. In open-seat races, the candidate who spent the most money won 92 percent of the 
time. A series of studies during the 1970's found that "what candidates spend in legislative 
contests is indeed related to how well they do on election day. "S8 Recent studies of state 
legislative campaigns have discovered that since voters receive relatively little information 
regarding state legislative races from independent sources such as the print media, "money 
provides candidates with the ability to inform voters about their candidacy and generate 
interest in the election ... the effect of campaign expenditures on the outcome should be 
substantial. "S9 Although much is known about the relationship between campaign 
spending and electoral outcomes, not much is known in a scientific way concerning how 
campaign spending actually influences an individual's vote choice. 
Candidates have found that in addition to increasing their share of the vote, campaign 
spending can be instrumental in eroding support for other candidates. This fuels an "Arms 
Race" mentality in which candidates plan to withstand attacks by their opponents by 
outspending them during the campaign. "In both campaigns and weaponry, fear is a 
principal motivation. Candidates and countries are afraid the other side will outspend 
them. They believe the best security lies in deterrence. They raise massive sums out of 
fear they will be outspent by their opponents."60 A study conducted during the 1988 
primary election cycle found that California legislative candidates spent approximately 
$20,000 to increase their share of the vote by 1 percent, while reducing their opponent's 
share by .8 percent.6• More campaign spending evidently pays off. However, the effect of 
spending on vote outcome diminishes incrementally. After a certain point, candidates stop 
receiving any benefits from spending money, leading Herbert Alexander to assert that, 
"perhaps half of all campaign spending is wasted. But no one knows which half "62 So 
candidates continue to spend, hoping that one last mailer or 30 second television spot will 
put them over the top. 
During the 1992 election cycle, candidates for the state Legislature spent a total of 
approximately $72 million on their campaigns. Combined spending on an typical Senate 
election reached nearly $1 million, while expenditures by Assembly candidates reached 
nearly $700,000 per seat. Ballot measure-committees spent a total of approximately $36 
million contesting the sixteen statewide propositions on the 1992 primary and general 
election ballots. Despite the large sums spent by California candidates and initiative 
campaigns, there is very little information available about how this money was spent 
during the campaigns. Inadequate information can be attributed, in part, to limited state 
ss Jacobson, 1978. 
S9 Gierzynski and Breaux "Money and Votes in State Legislative Elections", 1991. 
60 California Commission on Campaign Financing, 1985. 
61 Gierzynski and Breaux "It's Money that Matters", 1991. 
62 Alexander, 1992. 
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disclosure requirements. Current disclosure provisions require candidates to list the 
recipients of their expenditures, but listing the purpose of the expenditures is not required. 
For example, an expenditure to an individual could be a payment for campaign consulting, 
signature gathering, or maintenance work. 
Spending on initiative campaigns has also been shown to be a critical factor in electoral 
outcomes. In recent years, interest groups, certain regulated industries, and individuals 
have increasingly relied upon the initiative process to enact public policy measures that 
would be difficult or impossible to enact through the legislative process. As Professor 
Charles Price reports, due to the advent of paid signature gatherers, high levels of 
spending can quality virtually any measure for the ballot.63 The United States Supreme 
Court has ruled that prohibiting individuals from being paid to collect signatures violates 
their freedom of speech. 64 In 1992, qualification costs for the seven voter -initiated 
propositions ranged from $600,000 to $1.5 million each.6S 
Once a measure is placed on the ballot, campaign spending continues to have a significant 
impact on its eventual success. Studies by Daniel Lowenstein (1982) and David Magleby 
( 1984) found that campaign spending is perhaps the most critical resource of an initiative 
campaign. Election results may be affected by voter predispositions, the salience of the 
issue addressed by a ballot measure, free media available to voters, and the endorsements 
secured by both sides of an issue. By and large, however, "groups or interests opposed to 
an initiative can virtually guarantee the defeat of an initiative if they significantly outspend 
the proponents. "66 One-sided spending on behalf of an initiative apparently has a less 
dramatic, although still measurable, effect on voting outcomes. 
A general survey of campaign finance reports yields three general classifications of 
campaign expenditures: overhead costs; strategic and fundraising expenditures; and voter 
contacts. 
• Overhead costs comprise the smallest amount of the typical campaign budget and 
include campaign staff salaries, rent and utility costs for campaign headquarters, travel 
expenditures, and other fixed costs. 
• Strategic costs are the fastest growing segment of expenditures nationally67 and 
include consulting fees, polling, and fundraising expenses such as mail solicitations. 
Campaigns nationally have become increasingly professionalized as volunteer precinct 
walkers have given way to million dollar direct mail consultants. As Tommy Neal of 
the National Council of State Legislatures explains, "state legislators who a generation 
ago walked around the district passing out combs and pencils bearing their names are 
now hiring full-time campaign managers, pollsters, advertising specialists, and direct 
mail experts. "68 
63 Price, 1992. 
64 Meyer v. Grant, 1988. 
65 California Secretary of State, Qualification Costs of Statewide Initiatives. 1992. 
66 Magleby, 1984. 
67 Singer, 1989. 
68 Neal, 1992. 
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• Voter contacts represent the largest group of expenditures including direct mail, slate 
mailers, electronic media advertisements, voter-registration projects, get-out-the-vote 
efforts, and phone banks. 
Rising Costs? 
The aggregate cost of state legislative elections increased dramatically from 1958 until 
1990 and is rising again. 
Chart 20 
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However, two proximate causes of this increase, inflation and population growth, have 
been largely overlooked. While inflation has an obvious direct effect on campaign 
expenditures, population growth is slightly less intuitive. Population growth affects 
campaign spending because, "the larger the district, the higher is the likelihood that the 
more expensive methods of reaching people will need to be employed. "69 California 
legislative districts are the largest in the nation in terms of population (Senate districts are 
larger than congressional districts).70 As the number of constituents increases, candidates 
must spend more money on expensive campaign methods such as television and radio 
advertisements and direct mail to reach them. "Smaller constituencies should cut down on 
the expenses required to reach voters ... (because) they are more likely to be politically 
homogenous; hence incumbent candidates should find it easier to read constituents' 
opinions and to hold onto the district without spending a lot ofmoney."71 It simply costs 
a greater amount of money to reach a greater number of people. Many jurisdictions 
69 Singer, 1989. 
7° Cook and Simmons, 1994. 
71 Gierzynski and Breaux "Money and Votes in State Legislative Elections", 1991. 
CRB-IS-006 
July, 1994 
Page 29 of61 
recognize this when crafting expenditure limit provisions. For example, spending limits 
for gubernatorial candidates range from $400,000 in Vermont to $5 million in Florida. In 
addition, larger constituencies typically supply candidates With larger campaign chests than 
do smaller constituencies, providing candidates with more money to spend. 
The amount of money California legislative candidates spent per capita adjusted for 
inflation has actually decreased between 1980 and 1992. 
Chart 21 
Amount Spent by State Legislative Candidates 
Adjusted for Inflation and Population Growth 1980-1992 
$3.50 
$3.00 
$2.50 
$2.00 
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Sources: Fair Political Practices Commission and California Department of Finance 
The proportion of the population that is registered to vote in California has remained 
relatively constant since 1980; and the amount spent by state legislative candidates per 
registered voter shows a similar constant trend. (See charts in Appendix E.) 
Incumbency Advantage 
During the past two decades, California legislative incumbents have markedly increased 
their spending advantage over their challengers. Chart 22 shows that median expenditures 
by incumbents in general elections have increased since 1976, but expenditures by 
challengers have not grown proportionately. 
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Chart 22 
Median Expenditures by State Legislative Candidates 
1976-1992 General Electionsn 
Year Assembly Assembly Senate Senate 
Incumbents Challengers Incumbents Challengers 
1976 $25,135 $9,421 $86,275 $25,697 
1978 $47,379 $10,359 $59,367 $18,652 
1980 $84,956 $10,108 $109,250 $12,732 
1982 $94,122 $10,705 $208,105 $35,494 
1984 $115,410 $8,475 $241,622 $3,812 
1986 $119,310 $4,105 $248,105 $9,486 
1988 $185,177 $9,375 $296,330 $57,549 
1990 $147,806 $10,252 $235,894 $2,535 
1992 $175,075 $15,003 $210,033 $16,045 
Incumbency spending advantages, based on median amounts spent by candidates, were 
3-1 in 1976, over 25-1 in 1986, and decreased to 12-1 during the 1992 general election 
cycle. Chart 23 and Chart 24 illustrate median spending by incumbents and challengers as 
a proportion of total campaign spending by those individuals during the general elections 
between 1976 and 1992. 
Chart 23 
Spending by Assembly Candidates in General Elections 
1976-1992 
100% 
80% 
• ! I 80% 
- 40% ! 
20% 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
Source: Fair Political Practices Commission 
12 California Fair Political Practices Commission, 1991. 
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Chart 24 
Spending by Senate Candidates in General Elections 
1976-1992 
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Figures from primary elections show a similar pattern. In 1976, Assembly incumbents 
typically spent five times more than their opponents, and Senate incumbents spent four 
times as much. In 1984, these figures ballooned to an astronomical 105-1 advantage for 
Assembly incumbents and a 228-1 advantage for Senate incumbents. During the 1992 
primary election cycle, the spending advantage for Assembly and Senate incumbents was 
40-1 and 30-1, respectively. 
Chart 25 
Median Expenditures by State Legislative Candidates 
Year 
1976 
1978 
1980 
1982 
1984 
1986 
1988 
1990 
1992 
73 Ibid. 
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Assembly Assembly Senate 
Incumbents Challengers Incumbents 
$25,574 $5,190 $36,402 
$35,550 $8,106 $64,933 
$76,024 $12,219 $92,380 
$94,197 $11,010 $132,085 
$122,103 $1,165 $205,407 
$143,930 $2,615 $213,390 
$193,074 $3,938 $276,216 
$194,700 $7,873 $247,788 
$99,537 $2,474 $195,396 
Senate 
Challengers 
$8,593 
$7,067 
$2,730 
$3,536 
$899 
$2,083 
$3,249 
$3,496 
$6,412 
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Chart 26 
Spending by Assembly Candidates in Primary Elections 
1976-1992 
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Chart 27 
Spending by Senate Candidates 1976-1992 Primary Elections 
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Despite the substantial spending advantage which incumbents hold over their challengers, 
expenditures by challengers have more impact than those by incumbents. An authoritative 
study of congressional elections found that due to inherent incumbency advantages, such 
as name recognition and the resources of political office to increase that recognition, non-
. incumbents have the most to gain from campaigning and 11their level of spending has a 
greater impact on the outcomes of elections (because) marginal gains from a given 
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increase in campaign spending are much greater for challengers than for incumbents. 
What the challenger spends is an important determinant of the outcome, while spending by 
incumbents makes relatively little difference. "74 A series of recent studies has 
substantiated these findings at the state level, determining that "as in congressional 
elections, the effect money has on the vote depends on who is spending: money spent by 
challengers has a larger effect than money spent by incumbents. "7S 
The Role of Campaign Spending in the Elections Process 
Some observers question the ethics and rationale of spending 20 times the salary of an 
electoral office on a campaign. It is difficult to evaluate how much money is an 
appropriate amount to spend on a campaign. Electoral competition is increased by large 
amounts of spending: "the more both candidates spend, the better the challenger does. "76 
Furthermore, campaigns provide important information to the electorate. Constituents 
require adequate information to hold their representatives accountable. Campaign 
expenditures may fill an information void and educate citizens about policy alternatives, 
enabling them to competently voice their preferences through voting. The current level of 
publicly available state political information is low. For example, a February 1992 Field 
Poll found that 72 percent of Californians do not know who their State Senator is and 69 
percent do not know who their Assembly Member is. One interpretation of these figures 
is that citizens currently do not have enough information about state governmental 
institutions and their elected representatives, and therefore might benefit if candidates 
spend even more on their campaigns. On the other hand, certain campaign practices might 
disillusion voters and further discourage political participation. 
It takes a great deal of money to successfully compete for popular attention. State 
legislative candidates spent $72 million during the 1991-92 election cycle. However, this 
figure pales in comparison to the advertising budgets of major corporations. In 1992, 23 
companies individually spent more money advertising in California than the entire 
Legislature spent on campaigns. Procter and Gamble, for example, spent approximately 
$250 million advertising in California in 1992.77 While state legislative candidates in 
California spent $2.50 per capita in 1992, or $4.00 per registered voter, Washington Post 
reporter David Broder notes that the Big Three automobile companies spend an average 
of$208 on advertising per customer: "the comparison is not irrelevant. .. one reason the 
cost of campaigns is (high) is that candidates are competing, not just with each other, but 
with all the other procl.lcts and services being marketed to the American public. Why 
should a society that tolerates an avalanche of auto, soft drink, beer, and cold remedy 
advertising choke on a relatively small amount of political persuasion. "78 United States 
Senator Robert Packwood argues that the United States does not spend "anywhere near 
what other democratic countries do on their elections. We do not come near spending 
74 Jacobson. 1978. 
75 Gierzynski and Breaux "Money and Votes in State Legislative Elections", 1991. 
76 Jacobson. 1978. 
77 Advertising Age, 1994. 
78 Broder, 1991. 
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what we do in this country on advertising for pet food. I would like to think that the value 
of an election is worth as much as a can of cat food. "79 
Expenditure Limits 
Expenditure limits are designed to curb excessive campaign spending. Advocates also 
believe that they will enable non-incumbents to compete more equitably with incumbents, 
although the evidence cited above does not support this position. In 1974, California 
voters passed Proposition 9 which included spending ceilings for executive-office 
candidates. However, one year later, the United States Supreme Court's Buckley v. Valeo 
decision invalidated those limitations on the grounds that expenditure ceilings are 
"substantial restraints on the quality and diversity of political speech (and) the quantity of 
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, 
and the size of the audience reached. "80 
The court determined that First Amendment protections on free speech may only be 
restricted if candidates voluntarily accept spending limits in exchange for partial public 
funding of elections. Public campaign funding systems typically provide limited matching 
funds for contributions up to a specified amount to candidates who agree to limit their 
spending. Public funding is a critical and controversial aspect of most spending limit 
proposals, and will be addressed separately in this paper. Variable contribution limits are 
another mechanism for implementing voluntary expenditure limits which have been 
adopted by some municipalities (including the City of Oakland). Under this relatively new 
model, candidates who voluntarily accept spending ceilings are allowed to receive larger 
contributions than those who choose not to participate. In any event, spending limitations 
must be voluntarily accepted by candidates to be constitutional. 
Ten states currently limit the amount of money candidates may spend on their campaigns. 
Florida and North Carolina offer partial public funding to all executive-office candidates 
who limit their expenditures to specified amounts. New Jersey, Maryland, Rhode Island, 
and Michigan have similar programs in place for gubernatorial candidates only. Wisconsin 
and Minnesota have the two most expansive public financing/expenditure limitation 
programs in the country for all state legislative and executive campaigns. New Hampshire 
and Hawaii simply set voluntary limits without providing public funds or otherwise 
encouraging compliance. Even when adjusted to account for differences in population, 
spending limit levels vary significantly between jurisdictions. For example, Maryland 
limits gubernatorial candidates to spending $.46 per registered voter while Rhode Island 
limits candidates to $2.79 per registered voters. 
State campaign-finance systems do not always link public financing with spending limits. 
In New Jersey, where 2/3 of the money used for gubernatorial campaigns comes from 
public sources, the Election Law Enforcement Commission has "repeatedly advocated 
79 Congressional Record, June 3, 1987. 
80 Buckley v. Valeo, 1976. 
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repeal of expenditure ceilings" and maintenance of public financing provisions. 81 
Massachusetts has successfully adopted a "floors without ceilings" program to give seed 
money to qualifying candidates. This allows all candidates the opportunity to spread their 
messages early in a campaign and possibly become more viable candidates. Some 
jurisdictions have found creative ways to implement voluntary spending limitations. For 
example, while New Hampshire provides no public funds, the state incurs some revenue 
loss by waiving filing fees for candidates who voluntarily limit their spending. 
Limit Spending 
Expenditure limits can have widely differing effects on aggregate spending depending on 
the levels of the limits. While neither Proposition 68 nor Proposition 131 became law, 
they would have affected campaign spending levels in 1991-92 to a differing degree. In 
1988 Proposition 68 proposed to limit Assembly candidates to $150,000 in the primary 
election and $225,000 in the general election and Senate candidates to $250,000 and 
$3 50,000. In 1990, Proposition 131 proposed higher ceilings of $250,000 for Assembly 
primary elections and $400,000 for Assembly general elections, and $425,000 for the 
Senate primary and $700,000 for the Senate general. It is interesting to compare these 
limits to actual expenditures during the 1991-92 election cycle to estimate the possible 
effects of each initiative had they been in effect. Proposition 68 would have affected 15 
Senate races and 61 Assembly races in 1991-92, in which candidates spent a total of$14.6 
million in excess of the initiative's limits. Proposition 131 would have affected only four 
Senate races and 35 Assembly races, in which $8.2 million was spent in excess of the 
higher limits. Because only the highest-spending races are affected by campaign 
expenditure limitations, spending in other races will tend to increase as a result of the 
public financing provisions. Therefore, while some candidates will be limited in their 
spending, aggregate spending might actually increase. However, because the U.S. 
Supreme Court has determined that campaign spending limits must be purely voluntary, if 
ceilings are set too low, candidates may decline the incentives in order to maintain their 
desired level of spending. 
Independently wealthy candidates and candidates supported by large contributors are most 
likely to opt out of spending-limit programs. Therefore, most expenditure-limit proposals 
contain specific provisions restricting large contributions, personal contributions to a 
candidate's own campaign, and independent expenditures. Without these provisions there 
would be few incentives for competitive candidates to limit their spending. Because the 
Supreme Court considers independent expenditures and personal money to be "protected 
speech" under the First Amendment, any limits on these forms of spending must also be 
voluntary. Some jurisdictions provide incentives such as: 
• Granting public subsidies to candidates whose opponents benefit from independent 
expenditures or who spend more than a specified amount of their personal funds on 
their campaigns; 
• Removing expenditure limits for candidates whose opponents fail to limit their use of 
personal funds or benefit from independent expenditures; or 
81 Alexander, 1991. 
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• Requiring candidates who receive public funds to restrict their use of personal funds to 
a specified amount. 
Increase Competition 
Although incumbents raise and spend more money than their challengers, numerous 
studies show that limits on spending adversely affect challengers. In the vast majority of 
races, incumbents enjoy tremendous advantages over their challengers in name recognition 
among the electorate. Because name recognition is "the main electoral asset bought by 
money, "82 restricting the amount of money all candidates may spend will hinder the ability 
of non-incumbents to compete. Because candidates differ so drastically in the amount of 
information citizens have about them, due to incumbency status and other factors, 
expenditure limitations tends to solidify this difference, preventing lesser-known 
opponents from capturing public attention. For this reason, expenditure limits might work 
best in campaigns for open seat races in which no incumbent is running. Without 
advantages due to incumbency, more equal spending may result in more equitable 
competition. In 1992, challengers finished within ten percentage points of incumbents in 
four Assembly general election races. The average amount spent by the four challengers 
was well over $350,000. It is possible that these challengers would have had a more 
difficult time competing if expenditure limits had prohibited this high level of spending. 
82 Polsby, 1988. 
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PUBLIC FINANCING OF CAMPAIGNS 
Since Utah, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Iowa became the first four states to adopt partial 
public financing systems in 1973, twenty-five states have implemented public financing 
mechanisms in varying forms for state elections. Although Proposition 73 prohibits 
expenditures of public funds on political campaigns, California's tax code has allowed 
taxpayers to contribute to political parties with their income tax payments since 1982. 
State law permits individual taxpayers to contribute $1, $5, $10, or $25 to the California 
Election Campaign Fund. The California Franchise Tax Board disperses these 
contributions to the political party central committee designated by the taxpayer on the 
state income-tax form. The Franchise Tax Board deducts the program's operating costs 
from the fund, leaving political parties with modest sums. Chart 28 shows how much 
taxpayers have designated on their state tax forms to various parties since 1982. 
Chart 28 
Distribution of Funds to California Political Parties 1982-199183 
Year Democratic Republican Peace & Freedom Libertarian Independent 
1982 $233,819 $146,446 $12,065 $7,268 $6,692 
1983 $139,056 $120,022 $4,971 $4,138 $2,207 
1984 $110,011 $114,908 $3,371 $3,796 $1,230 
1985 $122,253 $117,131 $3,454 $3,252 $1,387 
1986 $119,316 $99,167 $3,414 $2,921 $1,542 
1987 $105,948 . $79,531 $2,031 $2,780 $923 
1988 $94,166 $76,426 $1,641 $2,971 $759 
1989 $105,332 $79,869 $1,626 $2,936 $1,517 
1990 $77,516 $60,464 $2,091 $3,119 $674 
1991 $75,045 $44,957 $1,433 $3,080 $1,008 
Although detailed figures are not available for 1992 or 1993, the Franchise Tax Board 
reports that total contributions to the program were approximately $120,000 each year. 
Public financing systems vary in four ways: the breadth of the program, the qualifications 
for receiving funds, the manner in which revenue is generated for the program, and the 
manner in which money is dispersed. 
Breadth of the Program: Recipients and Elections 
Public financing systems differ by which offices and elections are included in the program. 
• Gubernatorial: In 1995, twelve states will provide some form of public funding to 
gubernatorial candidates. Of those, just four states (Florida, Hawaii, Massachusetts, 
and New Jersey) provide funds for primary elections as well as general elections. 
• Executive Branch Officials: Six states include other statewide candidates in their 
programs. 
83 California Franchise Tax Board in Alexander, Goss, and Schwartz, 1992. 
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• Legislative: Four states provide public funds to state legislative candidates. 
Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Nebraska (as of 1994) provide matching funds to state 
legislative candidates in general elections. Hawaii is the only state to include primary 
elections for legislative candidates. 
• Political Parties: Fourteen states provide public funds to political parties. 
Because campaign spending impacts primary election results more than general election 
results, 84 reformers have suggested that public funding programs designed to enhance the 
ability of challengers to compete should include primary campaigns. Due to the number of 
legislative districts in which one party has a large registration advantage, competition 
might be more readily stimulated in primary elections. 
However, public financing can be a relatively costly program. Some states have phased it 
in gradually by beginning with general gubernatorial elections and expanding to other 
offices and primary elections. Chart 29 summarizes public financing provisions for the 
twenty-one fully-operational state programs currently in operation. States which enacted 
programs taking effect in 1994 are not included in this chart. (See Chart 32). 
Chart 29 
Public Financing Programs Nationally: Breadth of Systems85 
State Governor Statewide Legislature 
Alabama 
Arizona 
California 
Florida X X 
Hawaii X X X 
Idaho 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kentucky 
Maine 
Mass. X X 
Michigan X 
Minnesota X X X 
Montana X X 
New Jersey X 
N.C. X 
Ohio 
Rhode Island X 
Utah 
Virginia 
Wisconsin X X X 
· 84 Gierzynski and Breaux •n•s Money That Matters•, 1991. 
85 Alexander, Goss, and Schwartz, 1992. 
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Qualifications to Receive Public Funds 
One of the most controversial aspects of public financing systems is determining which 
candidates will receive money. Simply allowing any candidate who qualifies for the ballot 
to receive public funds might encourage fringe candidates, while excessive qualifYing 
requirements might unconstitutionally benefit incumbents or majority-party candidates. 
Most commonly, public funding systems for legislative or statewide office require 
candidates to raise a threshold amount of money to demonstrate that they are viable 
candidates. Some jurisdictions, instead, allow candidates to obtain a specified number of 
voter signatures to qualify for public campaign financing. 
The national public campaign-financing system for presidential elections relies on party 
registration to determine which minor party candidates are eligible for federal matching 
funds. To receive federal matching funds for his or her campaign, a presidential 
candidate's party must have received at least five percent of the vote in the previous 
presidential general election. Minnesota employs a similar rule, requiring minor parties to 
reach 10 percent of the vote in previous gubernatorial elections before its candidates 
become eligible for matching funds. Most jurisdictions require candidates to have 
opposition in order to receive public funds. 
Revenue Generation to Fund Public Financing Programs 
Revenue raising is a critical component of a public-financing system. There are generally 
three different ways to fund a public-financing program: tax check-off systems, tax add-on 
systems, and general fund revenues. 
A tax check-off system allows taxpayers to earmark a small portion of their tax liability 
(typically between $1 and $5) to an election fund that provides public funds to candidates 
and/or political parties. Proposition 68, had it been implemented, would have been funded 
by a taxpayer check -off system. While public participation varies across the country, 14.5 
percent of taxpayers participated in their state check -off systems on average in 1990.86 
This amount represents a sign!ficant decrease from previous rates: "participation in the 
states reached a high in the late 1970's and early 1980's and has been steadily declining 
since."87 
The Presidential Election Campaign Fund, which allows taxpayers to earmark one tax 
dollar to fund presidential primary and general elections, has experienced a similar decline 
in participation. The Fund increases disbursements with inflation, but does not adjust the 
one-dollar check-offfor inflation. The decline in taxpayer participation at the fixed $1 
contribution level coupled with increased disbursements might have forced the fund to run 
a deficit in 1996.88 However, Congress recently enacted reforms that raised the 
designation amount to a $3 voluntary designation. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Pace, 1994. 
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Chart 30 
Participation Rates of Eligible Nati.onal Taxpayers 
Presidential Election Campaign Fund 
1976-1992 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ i i ! ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ 
Source: Alexander, Goss, and Schwartz 
The tax add-on system pennits taxpayers to voluntarily increase their tax liability by a 
specified amount and to earmark that sum to an election fund. Strictly speaking, this is 
not a public-funding mechanism. Because the system relies on voluntary contributions 
from taxpayers, tax add-on systems simply funnel private contributions into a political 
fund for governmental distribution to candidates and political parties, without expending 
public funds. While the add-on system is popular among political officials because it does 
not detract from tax revenues or place additional burdens on the state budget, it also 
ensures that taxpayers will participate less than in tax check-offsystems.89 In California, 
the proportion of taxpayers choosing to increase their tax burden to contribute to political 
parties decreased from a high of. 9% to a projected low of .4% in 1994.90 If California 
chose to provide substantial public subsidies to candidates competing for statewide or 
state legislative office, it would have to explore funding sources in addition to the tax add-
on system. The largest amount collected for the fund, over $400,000 in 1982, would be 
insufficient to fund a fully-functional state public campaign-financing system.91 
89 Alexander, Goss, and Schwartz, 1992. 
90 Ibid and California Franchise Tax Board. 
91 California Franchise Tax Board. 
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Participation Rates of Eligible Taxpayers 
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State general-purpose funds are the third possible source of public funds for political 
campaigns. Five states (Florida, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Rhode Island) 
transfer general-fund revenues to state political election funds when revenues from their 
tax check-off programs are insufficient to balance the program costs. This assures that the 
public campaign fund systems can survive decreased taxpayer participation. It is also 
likely to place a substantial burden on the state budget. California's Proposition 131, had 
it passed, would have allocated $5 million from the state General Fund to augment a tax 
check-off program. The Legislative Analyst estimated that had Proposition 68 been 
implemented, its public financing provisions, not including administrative costs, would 
have reached approximately $9 million in 1988. The Legislative Analyst estimated that 
Proposition 13 1, which included higher funding levels and included both statewide 
executive and state legislative candidates, would have cost approximately $17 million in 
1990.92 
Dispersal of Public Funds 
When states provide public funds to candidates, they most often adopt a system of 
matching private contributions with public money at a specified rate. Some jurisdictions 
utilize matching-funds to provide incentives for candidates to alter their fundraising 
patterns. These jurisdictions identify what they believe to be more "desirable" 
contributions, such as small individual donations or in-district contributions, and augment 
them at high levels with public funds. Seattle has successfully implemented a matching 
funds system that has dramatically altered candidates' fundraising patterns (Appendix D). 
92 California Ballot Pamphlet, Primary Election 1988 and General Election 1990. 
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The total amount of money available to candidates from matching-funds programs 
depends primarily upon the match ratio, which is typically ~etween 1-1 and 5-l public-
private. The programs also usually specify a maximum contribution level for these 
matches, usually between $50 and $500 per contribution. Some programs (typically those 
without expenditure ceilings) specifically limit the amount of public money available to 
each candidate in order to prevent runaway fundraising and excessive spending. 
Other jurisdictions offer qualifying candidates direct public grants. This alternative is less 
common than offering matching-funds and yields different potential benefits. Candidates 
often need to establish themselves early in a campaign to gain credibility and attract 
potential contributors. Direct public grants might allow candidates to build a constituency 
base and become competitive earlier. This might enable less well-known candidates to 
compete more equally for private contributions with their already-established opponents. 
Unlike matching funds, block grants do not specifically encourage certain types of 
contributions. However, jurisdictions executing grant systems minimize their 
administrative expenses by issuing a single governmental check to each qualified 
candidate. Conversely, administering agencies for matching funds programs must process 
each qualifying contribution separately, thereby raising administrative costs. 
More complicated public funding proposals have been advanced. Some reformers have 
suggested providing state-subsidized television and radio broadcasting time. Electronic 
advertising comprises a relatively high proportion of campaign expenditures in California, 
and especially for statewide candidates. A similar proposal is to provide candidates with 
voter-contact vouchers to defray the costs of mailing, printing, broadcasting, or engaging 
in other activities that promote direct political dialogue with voters. All qualifying 
candidates would probably receive a fixed sum of state funding under either system. An 
alternative proposal, creating a comprehensive-contribution voucher system received 
national attention in the 1960's and 1970's. This system would severely restrict and 
possibly prohibit the use of private money for politic~} campaigns. Each citizen would be 
given a state-funded voucher that could be contributed to a candidate or candidates for 
campaign use. Vouchers would be the only acceptable form of currency for campaign 
contributions and expenditures~ the use of greenbacks for political purposes would be 
considered a form of corruption. 93 
The Debate on Public Financing- The Case For Public Funds 
Public financing, according to proponents, can mitigate the role of special interests and 
large contributors while altering fundraising patterns of candidates for political office. 
Public funds represent an additional independent source of funds from the traditional 
sources: political action committees, business, and labor~ individuals~ partisan sources; and 
family money. Unlike these other sources, public funding is not attached to a candidate's 
support of certain policies or interests. A comprehensive study of electoral competition 
and campaign finance conducted by Stanford University Professor David Baron 
discovered that public financing reduces the incentives for candidates to cater to interest 
93 For a complete discussion of campaign voucher proposals, see Ackerman, 1993. 
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groups while strengthening the "incentive to compete for the informed vote. "94 If a goal 
of campaign finance reform is to increase the relative proportion of a certain type of 
contribution, such as small individual donations, a matching funds program might help 
accomplish this objective. 
Public financing might also enable candidates to compete on a more equitable basis 
regardless of incumbency status or personal wealth. Data suggest that increased spending 
by all candidates, regardless of incumbency status, benefits challengers and other less well 
known candidates. Public funding can be made available to challengers in equal sums as 
incumbents, resulting in a substantial benefit to those candidates who are 
disproportionately disadvantaged at raising money from other sources. This may 
encourage a broader section of the population to consider seeking political office by 
making it easier for candidates to become viable. For example, in each Wisconsin election 
since 1982, challengers have received a far greater proportion of public funds, per 
candidate, than incumbents.9s As David Baron explains, "public financing of elections 
increases the probability of winning of the candidate who is the underdog. "96 In addition, 
public financing programs might encourage candidates to voluntarily limit other campaign 
activities in exchange for receiving public funds. For example, if public funds are 
sufficiently generous, individually wealthy candidates might agree to refrain from 
contributing exorbitant sums of money to their own campaigns. 
Public financing might limit some of the adverse consequences of contribution limits as 
they affect challengers, and facilitate the adoption of expenditure limits. As former Fair 
Political Practices Commission Chairman Daniel Lowenstein explains, "limits on 
contributions must be accompanied by public subsidies. Then the limits could be low 
enough to curb the influence of special interests while ensuring that candidates have 
enough money so that they can devote their time and energy to discussing the issues. "97 
In addition, public funding provides the only constitutionally approved system for limiting 
the amount of money which candidates for political office may spend.98 
The Debate on Public Financing- The Case Against Public Funds 
Critics of public financing of elections believe that campaigning for elected office is a 
private action undertaken by individuals competing in a private marketplace of ideas. 
Former Senator William Campbell explained, "why should the public have to pay for the 
government that they are getting? The least we can do is be compassionate enough not to 
foist on them the idea that not only do they have to pay for the candidate once he gets in 
office, but they have to pay to help get him into office. "99 They argue further that public 
financing creates a new bureaucracy that promotes governmental intrusion into private 
94 Baron. 1994. 
9S Alexander, Goss, and Schwartz. 1992. 
96 Baron. 1994. 
97 California Commission on Campaign Financing. 1985. 
98 Variable contribution limits have yet to pass any significant court tests. Please see Appendix IV. 
99 Alexander and Haggerty, 1980. 
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activities: supporting and helping to elect candidates for political office. Critics also 
suggest that public financing forces taxpayers to contribute money to candidates they do 
not necessarily support, impinging on their First Amendment rights. 
In addition to making these philosophical arguments, opponents of public financing also 
maintain that public financing is not an effective campaign finance measure. Rather than 
improving competition, it simply encourages a large number of non-viable candidates to 
seek election. The ballot-pamphlet argument against Proposition 68 claimed that public 
funding "will encourage irresponsible extremist groups to run for legislative office, not to 
win election, but to become eligible for tax dollars to finance their cause ... no matter how 
repugnant their views or how few votes they get at the polls." too Opponents of public 
financing argue that the ability to raise money is a reliable test of a candidate's popularity 
and viability and that providing public funds simply dilutes that process. 
Comprehensive Financing Systems 
Comprehensive campaign finance reform proposals include all of the three variables 
discussed so far: contribution limits, expenditure limits, and public financing. Alone, the 
three variables have different purposes and yield different results. The net result of a 
comprehensive system depends in large part on the emphasis of the program enacted. For 
example, strict contribution limits will result in a far different system than less stringent 
contribution limits in the same comprehensive system. Similarly, low expenditure limits or 
low levels of public funding will have a different impact than high spending limits and an 
expansive public-funding program. A recent study found that high levels of public funding 
can dramatically increase competition; low level funding coupled with expenditure limits 
might actually decrease competition. tot 
· 100 California Ballot Pamphlet. Primary Election 1988. 
101 Abramowitz, 1989. 
CRB-IS-006 
July, 1994 
Page 45 of 61 
DISCLOSURE OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE INFORMATION 
The purpose of public disclosure is to ensure that the public has information regarding 
how candidates raise and spend money prior to elections so that they can hold the 
candidates accountable for their campaign-financing practices. The Political Reform Act 
of 1974 states: "The people enact this title to accomplish the following purposes: Receipts 
and expenditures in election campaigns should be fully and truthfully disclosed in order 
that the voters may be fully informed and improper practices may be inhibited."1°2 
Variables of Campaign Finance Disclosure 
Public disclosure of campaign finance data involves a number of variables: 
• Filers: California law requires candidates, committees, and elected officeholders who 
raise or spend more than a specified amount of money to file campaign statements with 
the Secretary of State. 
• Threshold Levels: Candidates, elected officers, and committees established to support 
or oppose a ballot measure are required to report all contributions and expenditures of 
$100 or more and the sum of all contributions under $100. Any person or group of 
people receiving contributions totaling $1,000 or more, making independent 
expenditures totaling $1,000 or more, or making contributions totaling $10,000 or 
more in one calendar year, also must file a statement detailing all contributions of $100 
or more. In addition, any committee making independent expenditures that total $500 
or more must report all expenditures in excess of$100. 
• Frequency: Candidates, elected officers, and ballot measure and political committees 
are required to file semi-annual statements and two pre-election statements before 
each primary and general election. 
• Timing: Candidates must file semi-annual statements by July 31 and December 31. 
Pre-election statements for June elections are required by March 22 and by 12 days 
before the election. Pre-election statements for November elections are due on or 
before October 5, and by 12 days before the election. 
• Public Access: Campaign statements are public records and are maintained for public 
review by the California Secretary of State. 
• Enforcement: The Fair Political Practices Commission, a non-partisan appointed 
body, has primary responsibility for the administration and implementation of 
campaign finance regulations, including investigating possible violations, determining 
when violations have occurred, and imposing fines. 
Public access to campaign finance information is an important component of a campaign-
disclosure system. While California has relatively extensive disclosure provisions, the 
Secretary of State maintains this information in a cumbersome format that is essentially 
unavailable for analysis by individual citizens. After each filing deadline, stacks of 
campaign reports, some hundreds of pages long, line the tables in the Secretary of State's 
office. There is a wealth of information available in these reports, but citizens cannot 
102 The Political Reform Act of 1974. 
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realistically compile and analyze the data in a timely manner. Aside from the public 
interest groups who synthesize and disseminate the information to voters, the data go 
unscrutinized. In contrast, the Washington Public Disclosure Commission has a computer 
access system which makes free on-line campaign-finance data available to the public 
through computer bulletin boards. 
The United States Supreme Court, in considering whether disclosure provisions violate 
First Amendment protections on rights to privacy of association and belief, ruled that 
compelled disclosure, while a substantial infringement on privacy rights, is acceptable if it 
serves a compelling state interest. The court found that the disclosure of campaign 
information will "alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be 
responsive ... (and) deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by 
exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity." 103 Implementing 
additional disclosure requirements, such as lower threshold levels, increasing frequency of 
filings, and improving public access must also meet these objectives. While improving 
public access to campaign finance data clearly serves these purposes, the courts might find 
that more onerous disclosure provisions conflict with First Amendment protections. 
Major candidates for statewide and state legislative offices typically have a campaign 
treasurer or staff member responsible for compiling campaign finance reports. However, 
less well-funded candidates may find more demanding disclosure provisions to be 
excessively burdensome. 
103 Buckley v. Va/eo, 1976. 
CRB-IS-006 
July, 1994 
Page 47 of 61 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE PROVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
State 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii* 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
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Contribution Limits 
Unlimited, except $500 
limits on corporations. 
$1.000 per year from all 
sources. 
PACs and individuals 
limited based on the office~ 
corporate and labor 
contributions are prohibited. 
$1,000 per election from all 
sources. 
Unlimited, except for 
special elections. 
Unlimited. 
P ACs and individuals 
limited based on the office~ 
corporate and labor 
contributions are prohibited. 
$1.200 per election to 
statewide candidates and 
$600 to district candidates 
from all sources. 
$500 per election from all 
sources. 
$3,500 per election from all 
sources. 
$2,000 per election period 
from all sources. 
Unlimited. 
Unlimited. 
Unlimited, except 
corporations and labor are 
limited to aggregate levels 
per election. 
Unlimited, except corporate 
and labor contributions are 
prohibited. 
Chart 32 
Expenditure Limits Public Financing 
None. Grants to political 
parties from tax add-
on. 
None. Not Available. 
None. Grants to political 
parties from tax add-
on. 
None. Not Available. 
None. Grants to political 
parties from tax add-
on. 
None. Not Available. 
None. Not Available. 
None. Not Available. 
Executive office Matching funds to 
candidates accepting executive office 
public funds limited to candidates limiting 
spending $5 million for campaign spending 
Governor and $2 million from tax add-on and 
for cabinet races. state ~eneral funds. 
None. Not Available. 
All state candidates Grants to all state 
accepting public funds candidates limiting 
limited to spending based campaign spending 
on voter remstration. from tax check-off. 
None. Grants to political 
parties from tax 
check-off. 
None. Not Available. 
None. Grants to political 
parties from license 
plate revenue. 
None. Grants to political 
parties from tax 
check-off. 
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Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts* 
Michigan 
Minnesota* 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
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$2,000 per election to 
statewide candidates, 
$1,000 to Senate and $500 
to House candidates from 
all sources. 
$4;000 per election from all 
sources, except $6,000 from 
political parties, and 
corporate contributions 
prohibited. 
$5,000 per election to 
statewide candidates, 
$2,500 to district candidates 
from all sources. Broad-
based PACs limited to 2x's 
this amount. 
Individual contributions 
limited to $1,000 per 
election, all other sources 
limited to $5,000. 
$4,000 per candidate and 
$10,000 aggregate per 
election from all sources. 
Individual contributions 
limited to $1,000, PAC and 
labor contributions are 
unlimited, and corporate 
contributions are prohibited. 
$3,400 per election to 
statewide candidates, 
$1,000 to Senate and $500 
to House candidates from 
all sources; corporate 
contributions prohibited. 
All sources limited based on 
the office, ranging from 
$250-$20,000. 
Unlimited, except 
corporations limited to 
$1,000 per election. 
Unlimited. 
All sources limited based on 
the office, ranging from 
$250-$8,000. 
None. Not Available. 
Candidates accepting Grants to political 
contributions in higher parties from tax 
levels subject to specified check-off. 
spending limitations. 
None. Not Available. 
None. Grants to political 
parties from tax add-
on. 
Gubernatorial and Lt. Matching funds to 
Governor candidates Governor and Lt. 
accepting public funds Governor candidates 
limited to spending $.20 limiting campaign 
per capita. spending from state 
e:eneral funds. 
None. Matching grants to 
qualifying statewide 
candidates from tax 
add-on. 
Gubernatorial candidates Matching funds to 
accepting public funds Gubernatorial 
limited to spending $1.5 candidates limiting 
million. campaign spending 
from tax check-off 
and state general 
funds. 
All state candidates Matching funds to all 
accepting public funds state candidates 
limited to spending limiting campaign 
between $20,335-$1.6 spending from tax 
million, depending on the check-off. 
office. 
None. Not Available. 
None. Not Available. 
None. Grants to qualifying 
gubernatorial and 
Supreme Court 
candidates from tax 
add-on. 
Page 49 of61 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
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Unlimited. 
Individuals limited to 
$10,000 per statewide 
candidates and $5,000 per 
district candidate per 
election. Other sources are 
limited to 2x's this amount. 
$5,000 per election to 
candidates limiting their 
spending, $1,000 to all 
other candidates from all 
sources. 
$1,500 per election from 
individuals, corporations, 
and labor unions, $5,000 
from PACs. Unlimited 
transfers between 
candidates. 
Unlimited. 
Aggregate limits based on 
population for all sources~ 
PACs are unlimited. 
$4,000 per election from all 
sources, except corporate 
and labor contributions are 
prohibited. 
Unlimited, except corporate 
and labor contributions are 
prohibited. 
Unlimited, except corporate 
contributions are prohibited. 
$5,000 per calendar year 
from all sources, except 
corporate contributions are 
prohibited. 
Unlimited. 
Unlimited, except corporate 
and labor contributions are 
prohibited. 
$2,000 per calendar year 
from all sources. 
None. Not Available. 
None. Not Available. 
Candidates voluntarily Not Available. 
accepting limitations 
subject to limits 
depending on the office. 
Gubernatorial candidates Matching funds to 
accepting public funds gubernatorial 
limited to spending $2.2 candidate limiting 
million in the primary campaign spending 
and $5 million in the from tax check-off 
general elections. and state general 
funds. 
None. Not Available. 
None. Not Available. 
Executive office Grants to political 
candidates accepting parties from tax 
public funds limited to check-off. Grants to 
spending depending on executive office 
the office .. candidates limiting 
campaign spending 
from tax add-on. 
None. Not Available. 
None. Grants to political 
parties from tax 
check-off. 
None. Not Available. 
None. Grants to political 
parties from tax add-
on. 
None. Not Available. 
Candidates accepting Grants to political 
contributions in higher parties from tax add-
levels subject to specified on. 
spending limitations. 
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South Carolina $3,000 per year to statewide None. Not Available. 
candidates and $1,000 to 
district candidates from all 
sources. 
South Dakota Individuals limited to None. Not Available. 
$1,000 per year to statewide 
candidates and $250 to 
district candidates, PAC 
contributions are unlimited, 
corporate and labor 
contributions are prohibited. 
Tennessee Unlimited, except corporate None. Not Available. 
contributions are prohibited. 
Texas Unlimited, except corporate None. Not Available. 
and labor contributions are 
prohibited. 
Utah Unlimited. None. Grants to political 
parties from tax 
check-off. 
Vermont* $1,000 per election from all Candidates volwttarily Not Available. 
sources. accepting limitations 
subject to limits 
depending on the office, 
ranging from $2,000-
$400,000. 
Virginia Unlimited. None. Grants to political 
parties from tax add-
on. 
Washington Aggregate contribution None. Not Available. 
limits of $50,000 to 
statewide candidates and 
$5,000 to district candidates 
from all sources. 
West Virginia* $1,000 per election from all Candidates volwttarily Not Available. 
sources, except corporate accepting limitations 
contributions are prohibited. subject to limits 
depending on the office, 
ranging from $12,500-$1 
million. 
Wisconsin* Limitations based on the All state candidates Matching funds to all 
office and source of accepting public funds state candidates 
contributions as a limited to spending limiting campaign 
proportion of spending limit between $17,250-$1 spending from tax 
levels. million, depending on the check-off. 
office. 
Wyoming Individuals limited to 
$1,000 per candidate and 
None. Not Available. 
$25,000 aggregate per 
election; PAC contributions 
are unlimited, corporate and 
labor contributions are 
prohibited. 
Note: States marked with an • are described in more detail in Appendix D. 
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CAMPAIGN FINANCE PROVISIONS IN SELECTED LOCAL JURISDICTIONS 
Chart 33 
City Contribution Limits Expenditure Limits 
Berkeley $250 per election from all None. 
sources. 
Long Beach $250 for City Council, City candidates accepting 
$350 for citywide, and public funds limited to 
$500 for Mayoral spending between 
candidates per election $60,000-$300,000 
from all sources. depending on the office. 
Los Angeles* $250 for City Council and City candidates accepting 
$1,000 for citywide public funds. limited to 
candidates per election spending between 
from all sources. $300,000-$2 million, 
depending on the office. 
New York* All contributions to Voluntary expenditure 
citywide candidates are limitations range from 
limited to $6,500. $105,000 to $4 million 
Contributions to other per election depending on 
city candidates are the office. 
limited to $3,000. 
Oakland* Individuals limited to Candidates accepting 
$500 and broad-based contributions in higher 
PACs $1,000 per election levels subject to specified 
to candidates limiting spending limitations 
campaign spending. based on the salary of the 
Individuals limited to office being sought. 
$100 and broad-based 
PACs $250 to all other 
candidates per election. 
Sacramento Individuals limited to None. 
$500 per election to City 
Council and $1,000 to 
citywide candidates. 
PACs limited to $1,500 
per election for City 
Council and $3,900 for 
citywide candidates. 
San Diego* $250 per election from None. 
individuals, all other 
sources are prohibited. 
San Francisco $500 per election from all None. 
sources. 
San Jose $250 per election from all None. 
sources. 
Seattle* $350 per election from all Voluntary limitations of 
sources. $250,000 for Mayoral 
candidates and $110,000 
for all other city 
candidates. 
Note: Cities marked with an * are described in more detail in Appendix D 
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Public Funding 
Not Available. 
Matching funds to city 
candidates limiting 
campaign spending from 
city general funds. 
Matching funds to city 
candidates limiting 
campaign spending from 
city general funds. 
Qualifying candidates who 
agree to limit their spending 
may receive public 
matching funds up to 
$1,000 per contributor from 
the City General Fund 
Not Available. 
Not Available. 
Not Available. 
Not Available. 
Not Available. 
Qualifying candidates who 
agree to limit their spending 
may receive public 
matching funds up to $50 
per contributor from the 
Seattle General Fund. 
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OPTIONS 
There is tremendous variation in campaign finance programs at the federal, state, and local 
levels. (See Charts 32 and 33, pages 48-52). This variation provides a wide range of 
potential systems for consideration. Unfortunately, comparative evaluations of the various 
systems are extremely difficult because each jurisdiction has unique characteristics and 
concerns and campaign finance provisions reflect those differences. For example, while 
low contribution and expenditure levels may be appropriate for small, politically 
homogenous jurisdictions (such as some California cities), much higher levels are suitable 
for a large state with historically competitive elections, highly professionalized campaigns 
and large electoral districts. Therefore, it is useful to consider standards based on 
California's unique circumstances rather than borrowing specific reforms based solely on 
the experience of other jurisdictions. 
This section suggests some standards for framing and considering campaign finance 
reforms, discusses various issues related to the crafting of such reforms, and suggests 
alternative mechanisms for accomplishing some reform objectives. Each of the options 
could have a substantial impact on the conduct of California electoral campaigns. None of 
the alternatives is politically neutral and each might disproportionately benefit one or more 
groups of political actors or lead to "unintended consequences," given the interrelated 
nature of political systems. While not necessarily recommendations of the author or the 
California Research Bureau, the following are potential options for action. 
Of course, one alternative is to maintain the current system of campaign financing in 
California without adopting changes. Some commentators have argued that enacting 
campaign finance reforms would simply lead to greater governmental intrusion into private 
activities and that increased regulation of campaign activities would yield undesirable 
results. Others have suggested that the current system for financing campaigns in 
California encourages full participation by large segments of society and that establishing 
limits on the activities of these political actors might discourage participation in the 
political and electoral process. Finally, some critics of campaign finance reform have 
suggested that the United States Supreme Court's Buckley v. Valeo decision equating 
money with protected speech ensures that those who want to participate in the financing 
of political campaigns will be able to do so in spite of any reforms that may be 
implemented; this participation will merely take a different form. 
This final complaint regarding the constraints placed on reform efforts by the Supreme 
Court's ruling leads to a separate alternative, challenge the Buckley decision. In the long 
run, challenging Buckley, and possibly persuading the Court to adopt an alternative 
definition of protected speech might be a central component of any movement toward 
reform. If the Court were to overturn or amend Buckley, a host of potential alternatives 
would become available for legislative consideration. 
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Contribution Limits 
States differ fundamentally on the amount of money individuals or committees may 
contribute to candidates (Arizona and Montana restrict contributions to $250 while New 
York prohibits contributions in excess of$100,000). They also vary on the application of 
these limits to different contributors, and on the period of time in which the limits are 
applied. This variation indicates the difficulty of establishing appropriate and rational 
levels for contribution limits. 
Contribution Limit Standards: 
Each of the following strategies suggest a standard upon which contribution limits may be 
based: personal income, campaign expenditures, and current contribution patterns. 
Personal Income: The annual per capita income of California residents is approximately 
$21,350. Contribution limits could be established as a function of this level, such as ten 
percent, or $2,13 5 per year, from individuals. One direct benefit of this standard is that it 
would naturally adjust annually for inflation. The individual contribution limit could serve 
as a benchmark level for limits on other types of contributors, such as P ACs. 
Proportion ofFundraising/Spending: Contribution limits must be designed to serve the 
compelling governmental interest of eliminating corruption, or the appearance of 
corruption in order to meet constitutional standards. Given this standard, it makes sense 
to limit contributions to a proportion of all funds raised or spent during an election cycle. 
Candidates could be limited to accepting a set percentage of funds from a single source, 
based on average fundraising levels by competitive candidates during the previous election 
cycle (adjusted for inflation). Competitive candidates for the Senate raised and spent 
$550,000 on average for both elections combined. Competitive Assembly candidates 
raised and spent $450,000 on average. For example, one percent of these average 
fundraising levels would be $5,500 for the Senate and $4,500 for the Assembly, a possible 
contribution limit. Instead, if expenditure limits are a part of the program, contributions 
could be limited to a percentage of these spending levels. For example, one percent of 
Proposition 131's expenditure limits would be $6,500 per election cycle for Assembly 
candidates and $11,250 for Senate candidates. "One percent ceilings" would amount to 
$3,750 and $6,000 for candidates for the Assembly and Senate, respectively, under 
Proposition 68 expenditure limits. Further, contributions could be limited to aggregate 
levels by source. For example, candidates could be prohibited from receiving 
contributions in excess of one-third of the spending limits from either P ACs or political 
parties, ensuring that individual contributions would comprise at least 1/3 of all 
contributions. 
Current Contribution Patterns: Contribution ceilings could be based on current 
contribution patterns. For example, California legislative candidates in competitive 
elections currently receive, on average, 150 contributions of$1,000 or more, including 20 
contributions of$5,000 or more and 10 contributions of$10,000 or more. If all 
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contributions, regardless of source, were capped at $5,000, candidates would generally 
receive approximately twenty or more "maximum contributions." This would limit the 
impact of any single contributor. , 
Variation by Source 
Contribution limits generally vary for different sources. Typically, reform efforts are 
designed to encourage small individual contributions, which are more widely spread 
among the population and less significant on an individual basis than large contributions 
from wealthy individuals or interest groups. Similarly, contributions from political parties, 
which aggregate funds from many sources, may represent a more generalized interest. 
Because political action committees and political parties are ultimately financed by 
individual contributions, it seems appropriate that a level established for individual 
contributions be adjusted upward to account for the aggregation of individuals in political 
committees. Some analysts also value contributions from within a representative's district 
more highly. Others contend that elected officials must represent the entire jurisdiction, 
not just a district, and that contributions from outside a district are of equal democratic 
value. 
• Individuals: Existing contribution limit systems typically limit individuals in the 
amount of money they may contribute to any candidate or committee (including 
political parties). An alternative approach is to set aggregate individual contribution 
limit levels. For example, an individual could be limited to contributing up to $50,000 
to all candidates for state office. These aggregate limits typically compliment per 
candidate contribution limits, but may also be adopted alone. 
• Political Action Committees: P ACs are aggregations of individual contributors and 
therefore have higher contribution limits, usually two or three times the limit for 
individuals. An alternative is to limit narrow, limited membership P ACs, while 
adopting less stringent limits for broad-based political committees. California law 
currently distinguishes between these different kinds of P ACs. 
• Broad-Based PACs: To qualify for this classification in California, committees must 
receive contributions from one hundred or more sources and contribute to five or 
more candidates. In some jurisdictions, broad-based P ACs are prohibited from 
receiving contributions in excess of certain amounts (typically between one-fifth and 
one-tenth of individual limits). For example, ifindividuals are limited to contributing 
$1,000 to a candidate, PACs are typically required to accept a certain number of 
individual contributions of $200 or less to achieve this designation. Since broad-based 
P ACs bundle a large number of small contributions, the typical contribution limits are 
high, often ten times the level for individuals. 
• Political Parties: There are 1, 600 P ACs in California and just 6 registered political 
parties. Parties clearly represent larger aggregates of individuals, as required by state 
law for ballot status. Currently, new political parties must register approximately 
&0,000 individuals in order achieve ballot status. Furthermore, political parties fulfill 
an important function in the electoral system by organizing broad coalitions around 
policy preferences. Voters can hold officials accountable for actions of the governing 
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or minority party, facilitating democratic choice. Analysts generally feel that 
contribution limits for political parties should be very high or non-existent. 
• Partisan Transfers: It may be unconstitutional to limit partisan transfers of campaign 
funds from officeholders and legislative leadership to party candidates. (See Appendix 
A for a discussion of the constitutional issues involved). 
Time Period for Limits 
The period of time within which contribution limits are in effect varies in different 
jurisdictions. Constitutional issues are involved if the period of time disadvantages non-
incumbent candidates. (See Appendix A). 
• Per Election Cycle: Contributors could give up to the maximum amount to a 
candidate over the entire two or four-year election cycle, depending on the office 
being sought by the recipient of the contribution. 
• Per Election: Contributors could contribute up to a maximum amount for both 
primary and general elections. This might disadvantage candidates in competitive 
districts because they would have the additional burden of raising funds twice from 
their contributors. 
• Per Calendar Year: Contributors could give up to the maximum amount to an 
officeholder or political committee each calendar year. This would tend to benefit 
incumbents or open seat candidates who declare their candidacies far in advance of an 
election. (See pages 20 and 24). 
• Per Fiscal Year: Contribution limits based on fiscal year cycles have been declared 
unconstitutional by the federal courts. (See Appendix A). 
Other Contribution Limits 
A number of other potential issues surround contribution limits including: 
• Out of District Contributions: One option is to limit individual contributions from 
outside a candidate's electoral district, or to place aggregate limits on the amount a 
candidate may accept from out-of-district contributors. Some commentators have 
argued that this would disadvantage challengers, especially those in poorer districts, 
who find it difficult to raise enough money to reach their constituents. Another 
alternative is to allow larger or more contributions from within a district to provide a 
partial local fundraising incentive. A similar proposal is to make in-district 
contributions or lobbying expenses tax-deductible. 
• Off-Year Fundraising: A separate option is to restrict or prohibit candidates from 
raising funds during non-election years and directly following an election. This could 
partially remove the conduct of public business from the continual effort to raise 
private funds during non-campaign periods of time. This proposal would probably 
benefit challengers. (See pages 20 and 24). 
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• Cash on Hand: A final option is to restrict or prohibit candidates from carrying-over 
campaign funds from one election to another. This could prevent public officials from 
compiling large "war chests" to discourage potential opponents. 
Expenditure Limits 
Setting spending limit levels for statewide and state legislative candidates is a difficult task. 
California cannot rely on measures adopted by other jurisdictions because of vast 
differences in the size of representational districts, the degree of professionalization of 
political institutions, the competitiveness of elections, and the cost of specialized campaign 
activities (such as paid media and campaign consulting) which lead to tremendous 
variation between states. For example, spending limits for gubernatorial candidates range 
from $400,000 in Vermont to $5 million in Florida. Accounting for population does not 
diminish the variation between states. Maryland limits gubernatorial candidates to 
spending $.46 per registered voter for both elections combined while Rhode Island limits 
candidates to $2.79 per registered voter per election. 
Spending Limits Standards 
Each of the following strategies presents an alternative approach to establishing 
expenditure ceilings for state candidates in California. 
Current Spending Patterns: One option is to base expenditure limits on current spending 
patterns by candidates for state office in California. Levels could be based on the highest 
spending races, the average spending race, the highest open seat race, or the average 
open seat race. Spending by winning candidates in the previous election, adjusted for 
inflation, could be used to generate such levels at the outset. 
• State Senate: The largest amount spent by a candidate in 1992 was $925,000 in a 
primary election, $625,000 in a general election, and $1 million combined for both 
elections. Median spending by Senate candidates was $250,000 in the primary 
election, $300,000 in the general election, and $550,000 total for both elections. 
• State Assembly: The largest amount spent by a candidate in 1992 was $685,000 in a 
primary election, $725,000 in a general election, and $865,000 combined for both 
elections. Median spending by Assembly candidates was $200,000 in the primary 
election, $250,000 in the general election, and $450,000 total for both elections. 
• Open Seat Elections: Because open seat elections tend to be highly competitive, 
spending in those elections might provide a range for spending limits. The highest 
spending candidate in 1992 Assembly open seat races spent approximately $300,000 in 
the primary election, $525,000 in the general election, and $720,000 total for both 
elections. The average spending by victorious open seat Assembly candidates was 
$17 5, 000 for each the primary and general elections. 
Spending per Capita/per Voter: Spending levels could be based on a given amount per 
registered voter. This could be indexed according to population or voter registration in 
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order to differentiate between districts and offices. For example, Senate incumbents spent 
approximately $1.12 per capita and Senate non-incumbents spent $.13 per capita in 1992. 
Assembly incumbents spent $1.45 per capita and Assembly non-incumbents spent $.26 per 
capita. Per registered voter, Senate incumbents spent $2.60, Senate non-incumbents spent 
$.30, Assembly incumbents spent $3.32, and Assembly non-incumbents spent $.60. 
Spending Limit Adjustments 
Regardless of how expenditure levels are established, they could be adjusted annually for 
inflation, population growth, and/or average increases in the cost of media. They could 
also be established on a per election (primary or general) or per election cycle (both 
elections combined) basis. 
Trigger Mechanisms 
Expenditure limits must be accepted voluntarily by candidates in order to be constitutional 
(See page 33 and Appendix A). Four mechanisms for triggering expenditure limits are 
currently used in different jurisdictions. (See Chart 32 and 33, pages 48-52). 
• Public Funding: Candidates who voluntarily restrict their spending may receive public 
funds. (See pages 36-43). 
• Variable Contribution Limits: Candidates who agree to abide by voluntary 
expenditure limits may raise money in larger amounts than candidates who do not 
agree to the limits. This alternative might be unconstitutional. (See Appendix D). 
• Entirely Voluntary Program: If a jurisdiction sets a voluntary expenditure limit 
without providing public funds to candidates who agree to accept it, the program may 
be unconstitutional. (See Appendix D). 
• Waive Candidate Qualification Requirements: Filing fees or signature requirements 
to appear on the ballot may be waived for candidates accepting voluntary spending 
limits. This alternative might be unconstitutional. (See Appendix D). 
• Tax Deductions: Contributions to candidates voluntarily limiting their spending may 
be made tax-deductible up to a certain amount while contributions to non-participating 
candidates would not be deductible. This alternative might be unconstitutional. 
• Equal Time Provisions: Candidates spending above a specified amount may be 
required to provide equal time to their opponent(s) on all paid voter contacts made 
after the spending limit is surpassed. For example, once a candidate reaches the 
spending ceiling, she may be required to equally share each television and radio 
advertisement and direct mail piece with her opponent. This alternative appears to 
comply with the intent of the Buckley decision. (See Appendix D). 
Other Spending Limits 
Other forms of campaign expenditures may also be limited in a voluntary system. Possible 
alternatives including limiting the amount of money a candidate may contribute to his or 
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her campaign, and/or limiting the amount of independent expenditures which may be made 
on a candidate's behalf (See page 36). Some jurisdictions provide incentives such as: 
• Granting public subsidies to candidates whose opponents benefit from independent 
expenditures or who spend more than a specified amount of their personal funds on 
their campaigns; 
• Removing expenditure limits for candidates whose opponents fail to limit their use of 
personal funds or benefit from independent expenditures; or 
• Requiring candidates who receive public funds to restrict their use of personal funds to 
a specified amount. 
Public Campaign Financing 
Numerous jurisdictions provide public funds to candidates for political office. Public 
financing systems vary in four ways: the breadth of the program, the qualifications for 
receiving funds, the manner in which revenue is generated, and the manner in which 
money is dispersed. (See page 38). The most difficult aspect of implementing a public 
funding system is ensuring that public funds are used efficiently, and that fringe candidates 
are not encouraged to seek elective office simply to gain access to public funds, and that 
all viable candidates have the opportunity to receive public funds. 
Qualifications 
Various jurisdictions have adopted qualifications for candidates to receive public funds. 
• Fundraising: Candidates could be required to raise a threshold amount of money to 
qualify for public funds, thereby demonstrating that they are viable candidates. 
• Signatures: Another alternative is to allow candidates to obtain a specified number of 
voter signatures to qualify for public campaign financing. 
• Ballot Opposition: Most jurisdictions require candidates to be opposed on the ballot 
in order for them to receive public funds. 
• Debates: Candidates receiving public funds could be required to engage in one or 
more public debates prior to an election (as in Los Angeles). 
• Expenditure Vouchers: A final option is to require candidates to use public funds for a 
specified purpose, such as voter contacts. For example, candidates could be given 
vouchers for ten-minute television or radio commercials, or discounts on mailings. 
Revenue Raising 
Jurisdictions have generally experimented with three alternative mechanisms for generating 
money to fund a public financing system. (See page 40). 
• Tax Check-Off Taxpayers could be allowed to earmark a small portion of their tax 
liability to an election fund that provides public funds to candidates for state office. 
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• Tax Add-On: Taxpayers could be permitted to voluntarily increase their tax liability by 
a specified amount and to earmark that sum for an election fund. 
• State General-Purpose Funds: Funds may be allocated annually from the State 
General Fund to be dispersed to qualified candidates for political office. 
Alternative Systems 
Two alternatives to public financing systems might achieve similar results: voucher 
systems, and tax-based financing systems. 
Voucher Systems: Rather than simply limiting private contributions, a voucher system 
would prohibit them entirely. Citizens would be issued government vouchers worth ten to 
one hundred dollars that they could contribute to the candidates or committees of their 
choice. Each citizen could be guaranteed an equal amount to contribute to candidates, 
regardless of their income. Candidates would use these vouchers for all campaign 
expenses. Vendors receiving vouchers would redeem them at face value from the state. 
Independent expenditures and personal contributions from candidates, while impossible to 
limit on constitutional grounds, would be disclosed by the administering agency. 
Tax-Based Financing Systems: A tax-based financing system could be implemented to 
encourage certain contributions and discourage others. For example, small contributions 
from individuals could be tax deductible, while larger contributions could be taxed on a 
progressive sliding scale. Either the contributor or the recipient could be liable for this tax 
burden, with differing effects. Taxing contributors might provide powerful incentives and 
disincentives for particular contributions and generate income for the state at the expense 
of political candidates. Taxing recipients might reduce the amount of money candidates 
have available to spend. A tax-based financing system probably would be most effective 
as part of a comprehensive system in which public funds are re-distributed from this tax 
pool to candidates who accept spending limits. If the state should ever begin taxing 
services, these features may become part of that tax system. 
Campaign Finance Disclosure and Electoral Information 
Every state requires candidates for political office to disclose certain campaign finance 
activities, and empowers a public agency to enforce disclosure provisions and report 
pertinent information to the public. However, there is tremendous variation in disclosure 
requirements. Campaign finance disclosure provisions differ in five ways: who is required 
to file statements, when they must file statements, what these statements must contain, 
how this information is made available to the public, and how campaign finance provisions 
are enforced. (See page 46). Public access and enforcement are the most controversial 
provisions. 
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Public Access: 
Research suggests that campaign finance data is not readily available to the California 
public in an accessible format, although candidates and committees collect and file 
relatively detailed statements. (See pages 4 and 46). Alternatives for improving public 
access to campaign information include the following options: 
• Develop an on-line computer system for campaign finance data such as in place in 
Washington. (See page 47). 
• Require more extensive reporting by candidates of the sources and recipients of 
campaign funds, as well as the purpose of various expenditures. 
• Require the Secretary of State or the Fair Political Practices Commission to issue 
periodic reports (available on the Internet and in hard copy) detailing the sources and 
recipients of campaign funds by candidate such as in Los Angeles and New York City. 
(See Appendix D). 
• Require candidates to file campaign finance information on computer disk or pay in-
lieu fees to cover the cost of data entry. 
• Develop voter pamphlets which would give more information on candidates including 
statements and positions on issues as pioneered in New York City. (See Appendix A). 
Enforcement: 
Enhanced enforcement of the Political Reform Act (Title IX) could improve disclosure. 
Options include: 
• Adopt stricter penalties and larger fines for violation of Title IX. 
• Increase Fair Political Practices Commission funding for the purposes of improving 
investigations of possible disclosure and campaign violations, and for issuing regular 
reports on candidate compliance with campaign finance provisions. 
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APPENDIX A: ffiSTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM EFFORTS IN 
CALIFORNIA SINCE 1974 
Proposition 9 
In the wake of the Watergate scandal, the California Legislature passed two significant 
measures in 1973 that were designed to reform politics and campaigns in California. The 
Waxman-Dymally Act required candidates to register their campaign committees with the 
Secretary of State and to file campaign statements (at specified times before and after the 
election) disclosing receipts and expenditures over $100. The Moscone Conflict of 
Interest Act required public officials to disclose their financial and property interests. 
Concurrently, a handful of political reform groups, including California Common Cause, 
Ralph Nader's California Citizen Action Group, and People's Lobby, Inc. teamed with 
then-Secretary of State Edmund G. Brown, Jr. to propose even more stringent reform 
measures. The coalition drafted an initiative and gathered enough signatures to qualify it 
for the June 1974 ballot as Proposition 9, The Political Reform Initiative. 
Proposition 9 was the most comprehensive campaign and ethics reform package ever 
proposed in California. It proposed to regulate numerous aspects of political campaigns 
including campaign finance disclosure, limits on campaign spending, restrictions on the 
actions of lobbyists, and safeguards against conflicts of interest. According to the 
proponents of the measure, the Proposition 9 was designed to "put an end to corruption in 
politics, and (make) politicians directly responsible to the people-not to purchased 
demands of special interests."104 Arguments in the voters' pamphlet asserted, "the impact 
of Watergate and related events has obviously contributed to the serious decline of citizen 
confidence in the governmental process; Proposition 9 will give citizens a basis for the 
faith and trust which must lie at the heart of our political process. "tos 
Proposition 9 was formally opposed by numerous business and labor groups, including the 
AFL-CIO, the California Chamber of Commerce, the California Bankers Association, and 
the California Manufacturers Association. Opponents of the measure contended that, 
"powerful interests do not dominate California elected officials. It is an over-kill attempt 
to legislate honesty into political campaigns. This cannot be done; it is not needed. "106 
California voters apparently did not agree and overwhelmingly approved Proposition 9 
with nearly 70 percent support. 
Proposition 9 included the following key provisions: 
• Required campaign committees receiving or spending $500 or more dollars to file a 
statement of organization with the Secretary of State and to file periodic reports 
detailing financial activities. 
104 California Secretary of State, June 4, 1974. 
lOS Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
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• Required these campaign finance reports to identify all contributors of $50 or more 
and each person or corporation to whom an expenditure of $50 or more was made. 
• Limited candidates for Governor to spending no more than seven cents per voting-age 
citizen in primary elections and nine cents in general elections. Limited candidates for 
other statewide offices to spending three cents in both the primary and general 
elections. Incumbents seeking re-election were prohibited from spending more than 
90 percent of the applicable spending limit placed on their challengers. 
• Required lobbyists to register with the Secretary of State. 
• Required lobbyists to report periodically all payments received for their lobbying 
activities and to report all lobbying expenses, including an itemized list of any activity 
that would benefit public officials, candidates, or their families. 
• Prohibited lobbyists from spending more than $10 per month on a single public official 
and from arranging or making campaign contributions to both public officials and 
candidates. 
• Required public officials to report all financial holdings that might be affected by their 
actions as officeholders, and were disqualified from participating in the decision-
making process surrounding those issues. 
• Required the Secretary of State to send a ballot pamphlet to all voters prior to each 
election detailing provisions of all measures up for a vote and offering arguments for 
and against each measure as presented by the Legislative Analyst. 
• Created the five member Fair Political Practices Commission with a mandated annual 
appropriation of $1 million to enforce the act and establish penalties for non-
compliance. 
Just after California approved Proposition 9, the United States Congress passed The 
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, "the most sweeping federal 
campaign reform law in history. "107 The Act enacted the following key provisions: 
• Established contribution limits to candidates for federal offices ($1, 000 for individuals 
and $5,000 for political committees, the total of which could not exceed $25,000); 
• Prohibited independent expenditures above $1, 000; 
• Limited the amount of personal or family money a candidate could spend on his or her 
own campaign to specified amounts depending on the office being sought; 
• Restricted overall general election and primary campaign expenditures by candidates 
to specific amounts depending on the office being sought; and, 
• Created strict campaign finance reporting requirements for donations and expenditures 
over $100. 
The United States Supreme Court's landmark 1975 decision in Buckley v. Valeo 
invalidated many provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act: 
• The Court ruled that while political contributions represent "speech by proxy,"108 
contribution limits "are appropriate legislative weapons against the reality or 
· 
107 Alexander, 1991. 
108 Buckley v. Valeo, 1976 
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appearance of improper influence stemming from the dependence of candidates on 
large campaign contributions, and ceilings imposed serve the basic governmental 
interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without directly impinging 
on the rights of individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and 
discussion." 109 Contribution limits whose purpose is to prevent governmental 
corruption represent the "single exception to the rule that limits on political activity 
(are) contrary to the First Amendment."llO 
• The Court found that campaign finance disclosure provisions are generally 
constitutional because they "serve substantial governmental interests in informing the 
electorate and preventing the corruption of the political process." 111 
• Conversely, the court ruled that the independent expenditure ceilings, limits on 
candidates expending personal funds on their campaigns, and overall campaign 
expenditure limits are unconstitutional because "those provisions place substantial 
and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and association to engage 
in protected political expression." 112 While limits on contributions "involve little direct 
restraint on ... political communication," expenditure limits place "substantial restraints 
on the quality and diversity of political speech, the quantity of expression by restricting 
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the 
audience reached" 113 The Court ruled that for expenditure limits to be constitutional, 
they must be voluntarily accepted and combined with some form of public financing. 
Since the federal legislation did not enact public financing of campaigns, expenditure 
limits were declared void. 
Although the Buckley decision specifically addressed the Federal Election Campaign Act 
Amendments of 1974, the ruling applied to state laws as well. In April of 1976, the 
California Supreme Court applied the reasoning in Buckley to Proposition 9 in its ruling in 
Citizens for Jobs and Energy v. FPPC. The Court found the expenditure limits enacted 
by Proposition 9 to be unconstitutional. At the same time, a series of lawsuits brought by 
the California Bankers Association and the Institute of Governmental Advocates 
challenged Proposition 9's restrictive lobbying provisions. The Court affirmed disclosure 
provisions and the $10 per month limit on expenditures for public officials. However, in 
FPPC v. Superior Court (/GA), the Court invalidated the ban on direct contributions by 
lobbyists to candidates114 and the requirement that lobbyists make itemized monthly 
reports on the value of transactions with public officials. During the 1977 legislative 
session, the Legislature officially repealed the provisions ruled unconstitutional to comply 
with the rulings. 
1091bid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 1981 
112 Buckley v. Valeo, 1976 
113 Ibid. 
114 The FPPC had interpreted this to mean a prohibition on lobbyists arranging contributions from their 
employers. 
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Legislative Reform Proposals (1976-1984) 
In the immediate aftermath of court rulings, the State Legislature considered legislation to 
enact various Proposition 9 reforms in a constitutionally acceptable format. Two 
measures debated at the end ofthe 1975-76 general session were designed to save the 
expenditure limits in Proposition 9. Since expenditure limits are constitutionally 
acceptable only if accompanied by a system of public financing, both AB 466 (Goggin) 
and AB 2817 (Keysor) proposed a system of public financing for statewide elections. 
Neither bill defined the manner in which public money would be granted to political 
candidates; neither was enacted. 
The Legislature again considered a number of campaign finance measures during the 
1977-1978 legislative session. The most comprehensive ofthese measures, AB 1372 
(Fazio) proposed a system of campaign financing that included contribution limits, 
expenditure limits, and the public funding of campaigns. Fazio's bill limited contributions 
by individuals to $500 and by political committees to $1,500. In order to qualify for state 
matching funds at a rate of 3 to I, candidates had to voluntarily agree to donate no more 
than $20,000 oftheir own funds for statewide races or $10,000 for state legislative races. 
In addition, candidates had to abide by strict spending limits based on the office being 
sought and the number of eligible voters residing in the district. Assembly candidates 
were allowed to spend up to twenty-two cents per eligible voter and State Senate 
candidates were allowed up to fifteen cents. Statewide candidates were allowed between 
two cents and seven cents depending on the office. The bill passed the Assembly 
Elections and Reapportionment Committee but was defeated by the Assembly Ways and 
Means Committee. 
During the 1979-1980 general session, the Legislature again considered a number of 
campaign finance proposals. AB 2927 (Hart) proposed a comprehensive system of 
campaign finance for state legislative campaigns. The bill established political party 
contribution limits of up to $15,000 for Assembly candidates and $25,000 for Senate 
candidates, and limited individual contributions to $500 and political committee 
contributions to $1,500. A unique provision allowed Assembly candidates to transfer no 
more than $20,000 from their primary election fund to their general election campaign; the 
limit was $30,000 for Senate candidates. At the center of the proposal were strict 
voluntary expenditure limits and a limitation on the amount of personal money candidates 
could spend on their own campaigns. In exchange for agreeing to these voluntary limits, 
candidates representing political parties with at least 25% registration in the district would 
receive a lump sum payment of$10,000 for State Assembly candidates and $15,000 for 
State Senate candidates. In addition, candidates would receive 3 to 1 public matching 
funds. The bill was passed by the Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee 
but never reached the Floor. 
During the 1981-1982 session, the Assembly again considered legislation to establish a 
system of campaign finance. AB 2193 (Harris), which resembled AB 2927 (hart) from the 
previous term, reached the floor of the Assembly before falling short of the necessary 2/3 
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vote, 45-17. Another comprehensive proposal, AB 3385 (Vasconcellos and Willie 
Brown) proposed contribution limits, expenditure limits, and 1 to 1 public matching funds. 
The bill required all candidates applying to receive public matching funds to limit 
campaign expenditures to $130,000 for Assembly races and $260,000 for Senate races, 
and to limit spending of their personal funds to $10,000 in Assembly races and $20,00 in 
Senate races. AB 3385 failed in the Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee. 
Rapidly escalating campaign spending in the 1982 elections and increased pressure from 
the media and public interest groups raised the prominence and visibility of campaign 
reform in the 1983-1984 legislative session. In all, over twenty-three separate 
comprehensive campaign financing schemes were introduced in the Legislature. Of these, 
four passed their house of origin and two, AB 12 (Vasconcellos) and AB 311 (Connelly) 
were sent to a conference committee. The Vasconcellos proposal was similar to his AB 
3385 a session earlier except that it allowed candidates to spend slightly more money and 
contained a unique provision benefiting candidates facing wealthy opponents who refuse 
to limit their personal expenditures. In an attempt to even the playing field, the individual 
opposing a wealthy candidate who spends unlimited personal funds would be allowed to 
double his or her campaign expenditures and receive up to 2/3 of the limits in 2 to 1 
matching funds. ($200,000 for the Assembly and $400,000 for the Senate). The 
conference committee was unable to report out AB 12. 
Assembly Member Connelly's AB 311 proposed a comprehensive campaign finance 
system: limits on contributions, expenditure limits, restrictions on the use of personal 
funds, and public matching funds. In addition, it prohibited the transfer of funds between 
candidates' campaign committees. The conference committee added a provision that tied 
the bill to the passage of Proposition 40. If Proposition 40 garnered majority approval, 
AB 311 would supersede it~ if the initiative failed, neither measure would be enacted. 
The bill was passed by the Legislature but Governor George Deukmejian vetoed it, citing 
his opposition to the public financing provisions. 
Proposition 40 (1984) 
In the spring of 1984, Assembly Member Ross Johnson had unveiled an initiative proposal 
to "dramatically reform the way campaigns for state office are financed." Assembly 
Member Johnson argued that his proposal, Proposition 40, The Fair Campaign Finance 
Amendments to the Political Reform Act, would correct a system dominated by the 
"scramble for the almighty tax dollar (by) placing reasonable limits on contributions."tts 
Proposition 40 prohibited contributions from corporations, labor unions, and transfers 
from other candidates. Only political action committees, parties, and individuals would be 
allowed to donate, and their donations would be limited to $1000 per candidate per fiscal 
year. Individuals were further prohibited from contributing more than $250 to political 
parties and political committees. The measure prohibited all anonymous and cash 
contributions and required candidates to file declarations of their candidacy prior to 
liS Fair Political Practices Commission, 1984. 
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soliciting or receiving any campaign funds. A minor, yet controversial, provision provided 
limited public funds to candidates facing wealthy candidates. In order to discourage the 
use of personal money, a candidate would receive one dollar in public money for every 
dollar his or her opponent spent of personal funds, up to one million dollars. 
Johnson argued that the measure would limit the amount of money in political campaigns, 
help control the power of special interests, and provide for more competitive elections. 
Opponents, including political parties, assorted labor and business groups, and California 
Common Cause, raised objections, claiming that the proposal would limit the ability of 
challengers to raise enough money to successfully campaign against incumbents. 116 
Further, the FPPC warned that the measure would actually increase the relative 
importance of PAC contributions from approximately 1/3 to 112 of all campaign funds as 
other forms of contributions were limited or prohibited.117 Proposition 40 was defeated in 
the November 1984 General Election by a 65 percent to 35 percent margin. 
Legislative Reform Proposals (1985-1988) 
After the defeat of Proposition 40, over thirty different comprehensive reform proposals 
were considered in the next two legislative sessions. Although the proposals received 
varying levels of support and achieved varying degrees of success, none of the measures 
were sent to the Governor. Senator Bill Lockyer's SB 90 was one of the more promising 
measures. Under its provisions, candidates for state legislative office would face either 
strict contribution or expenditure limits. At a specified time before an election, candidates 
would be required to choose to accept either contribution limits ($1,000 from individuals, 
$3,000 from PACs, and $5,000 from political parties) or expenditure limits ($230,000 for 
Senate candidates for the primary and $405,000 for the general election, and $115,000 for 
Assembly candidates for the primary and $230,000 for the general election). In exchange 
for accepting expenditure limits, candidates would receive public matching funds from a 
Legislative Elections Fund. Taxpayers could transfer up to five dollars of their income 
taxes to the Fund by checking off a box on their tax forms. Nominees for legislative 
offices would have to reach specified fundraising thresholds in order to become eligible for 
public funds. Interestingly, the bill also proposed contribution limits for candidates for 
local offices. The measure paSsed the State Senate by a vote of 22-10, but was never 
considered by the Assembly. Senator Lockyer's subsequent measure, SB 111, faced a 
similar fate during the following session. 
Assembly Member Filante proposed a unique alternative form of public financing in 1985. 
In order to persuade candidates to accept voluntary expenditure limits, Filante's AB 4358 
established a system of tax credits for small political contributors. The measure granted a 
50% tax credit to individuals contributing $100 or less to a candidate vying for office in 
their district and who agreed to expenditure limits. All other political contributions were 
not tax deductible. The proposal was defeated by the Assembly Ways and Means 
Committee. 
116 California Common Cause, 1984. 
117 Fair Political Practices Commission, 1984. 
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In 1987, Assembly Member Jackie Speier introduced AB 2051 to institute a system of 
public financing of campaigns, combined with contribution limits, voluntary expenditure 
limits, prohibitions on the transfer of campaign funds, and limits on the receipt of gifts and. 
honoraria that Members of the Legislature and candidates for elective office could receive. 
Public funds would be available to candidates on a matching fund basis. Political 
contributions would no longer be tax deductible and taxpayers would instead have the 
ability to add up to $3 to their tax liability to be deposited into a state political campaign 
fund. AB 2051 was defeated in the Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee. 
Senator Milton Marks introduced SCA 34 which called on the Legislature to enact limits 
on the source and amount of political contributions, prohibit the transfer of campaign 
funds, and provide public funding for candidates accepting expenditure limits. A fund 
would be created through either a voluntary "add-on" or "check-off' system. Unlike other 
proposals, details of the system were intentionally left out of the legislation. Rather, the 
purpose of the constitutional amendment was to have the public ratify the general 
framework of a comprehensive reform system while leaving the details to future legislative 
consideration. SCA 34 was defeated by the Senate Appropriations Committee. 
Propositions 68 and 73 (1988) 
In 1984, the California Commission on Campaign Financing was created to examine the 
exploding cost of political campaigns in California. The Commission, a non-partisan, non-
profit organization, contained prominent members of the business community, labor 
leaders, legal experts, and academics. The first Commission report, The New Gold Rush: 
Financing California's Legislative Campaigns, focused on problems in campaign 
financing and issued a series of recommendations for reform including a model law for 
state legislative campaigns. Bolstered by business support for the proposal, members of 
the Commission decided to sponsor an initiative and place the proposal on the ballot. The 
measure was placed on the June 1988 primary ballot as Proposition 68. Proposition 68 
was directed only at state legislative elections. It contained the following key provisions: 
• Limited contributions by individuals to candidates to $1,000 or less per candidate and 
a total of$25,000 per election. 
• Limited contributions by political committees to $2,500 or less per candidate and a 
total of$200,000 per election. 
• Limited contributions by "small contributor" political committees (P ACs that accept 
no contributions over $50) to $5,000 or less per candidate per election. 
• Prohibited non-election year contributions. 
• Prohibited Assembly candidates from accepting $50,000 or more from PACs and 
Senate candidate from accepting $75,000 or more from PACs. 
• Limited political parties to contributing $50,000 to an Assembly candidate and 
$75,000 to a Senate candidate. 
• Prohibited transfers of funds between candidates. 
• Established a system of public funding based on a taxpayer "check-off' system. 
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• Required candidates receiving public funds to collect a minimum amount of private 
money, be opposed by a candidate who had collected at least $35,000, and voluntarily 
limit campaign spending and personal money expenditures. 
• Matched contributions of $250 or less from voters in the candidate's district on a 5 to 
I ratio. Matched all other contributions on a 3 to I ratio. 
• Limited Assembly candidates to spending $I50,000 for a primary election and 
$225,000 for a general election. For Senate candidates, limits were $250,000 for a 
primary election and $350,000 for a general election. 
Three Legislators (Assembly Member Ross Johnson and Senators Montoya and Kopp) 
drafted a counter-initiative similar to Proposition 40, and qualified it for the ballot, where 
it was designated Proposition 73. Proposition 73 contained both campaign finance and 
ethics reform provisions for both legislative offices and statewide offices. Its most striking 
distinction from Proposition 68 was its ban on public financing for all political campaigns 
in California. 
Proposition 73 contained the following provisions: 
• Limited contributions from individuals to SI,OOO per candidate per fiscal year; limited 
political committee contributions to $2,500; and limited broad-based political 
committees and political party contributions to $5,000. 
• Prohibited transfers of funds between candidates. 
• Restricted gifts and honoraria for elected officials. 
• Prohibited candidates for public office from receiving public campaign funds. 
• Banned publicly funded newsletters and mass mailings. 
As voters waded through the conflicting arguments of the Proposition 68 and Proposition 
73 supporters, they were also confronted by a third group that opposed both sets of 
reform. The "No-No campaign" was lead by Assembly Speaker Willie Brown and Senate 
Majority Leader David Roberti and spent $1.3 million. 118 Adding to the confusion was 
the presence of other complex and competing issues on the ballot, including auto 
insurance reform. 
Proposition 68 passed by a margin of 53 percent to 47 percent. Surprisingly, Proposition 
73, whose supporters spent just $30,000 on the campaign, passed by a vote of 58 percent 
to 42 percent. Thus, during the same election, California voters both approved and 
disapproved the public financing of political campaigns. The passage of the two 
conflicting measures resulted in over five years of legal battles and court rulings and, some 
analysts contend, a disappointed and disillusioned electorate. 
The California Constitution specifies that, "if the provision of two or more measures 
approved at the same election conflict, those of the measure receiving the highest 
affirmative vote shall prevail. "119 Advocates of Proposition 73 claimed that it should be 
. 118Jbid. 
119 California Constitution Article II Section IO(b). 
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adopted in full and invalidate all of Proposition 68. Supporters of Proposition 68 
countered that nearly thirty separate provisions of the initiative did not directly conflict 
and should therefore become law. The Fair Political PractiCes Commission attempted to 
sort out the separate provisions. However, supporters of Proposition 68 mounted a legal 
challenge against the FPPC. The California Supreme Court ruled in Taxpayers to Limit 
Campaign Spending v. FPPC that "because the two schemes were presented to the voters 
as alternative, competing measures, only Proposition 73, which received the higher 
number of affirmative votes, was effective ... and that Proposition 68 was inoperative. "12° 
While this ruling apparently sealed the fate of Proposition 68, the legal battles surrounding 
Proposition 73 continued. The next round of court rulings began when a number of 
opponents ofProposition 73 challenged the constitutionality of its contribution limit 
provisions. In Service Employees International Union v. FPPC, a federal district court 
found that because the contribution limits were based on fiscal years, rather than election 
cycles, they "unconstitutionally discriminate in favor of incumbents and their supporters 
and against challengers and their supporters."121 Citing the Supreme Court decision in 
Buckley, the court also found the ban on the transfer of funds to be an unconstitutional 
expenditure limitation. The court did, however, suggest that a more narrowly defined 
restriction on transfers might be constitutionally acceptable. The ruling applied only to 
general and primary elections: the contribution limits and the ban on transfers of funds 
were retained for special elections. Other sections of the initiative remained in force. 
Rather than disrupt campaigns already in progress, the court ruled that disputed the 
Proposition 73 limits would remain in force for state legislative candidates until the end of 
the 1990 election cycles. A report by California Common Cause found that fundraising by 
state legislative candidates decreased markedly under Proposition 73. Legislative 
candidates raised $79 million in 1988, only $52 million in 1990, and $72 million in 
1992.122 However, the ratio by which incumbents were able to outraise and outspend 
challengers increased dramatically in 1990. In 1988 and 1992, incumbents outraised their 
opponents by five to one. In 1990, under Proposition 73, incumbents held an eight to one 
advantage in fundraising.123 This seems to support the Court's reasoning. 
Once Proposition 73's key provisions were declared unconstitutional, proponents of 
Proposition 68 moved to have it re-activated. They argued that because the contribution 
limits were invalidated for primary and general elections, "the remaining parts of 
Proposition 73 are likewise unenforceable because they are nonseverable from the invalid 
portions of the measure."124 The California Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that the 
"claim must fail if any substantial part of Proposition 73 survives." Since the ban on 
publicly funded mass mailings in Proposition 73 "was a substantial feature of the 
120 Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. FPPC 1990. 
121 Service Employees International Union v. FPPC 1990. 
122 California Common Cause, 1993. 
123Jbid. 
124 Walter Gerken, eta/. v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 1993. 
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initiative," it prevented the re-institution of Proposition 68.12s In a sharply worded 
dissent, Justice Arabian argued that "the overriding objective of the voters who supported 
the measure cannot be achieved. "126 He asserted that voters approved of both measures in 
order to ensure that one or the other would be adopted. Instead, only minimal aspects of 
one initiative have actually taken effect. 
In March 1994 Senator Quentin Kopp and Assembly Member Ross Johnson petitioned the 
California Supreme Court to remedy the portions of Proposition 73 declared 
unconstitutional by the federal court by judicially changing the construction of 
contribution limits from a fiscal year to an election cycle basis. Although several justices 
appear to have encouraged this action, it remains unclear whether the court will revive the 
measure. A court decision is expected in August. 
Proposition 131 (1990) 
In 1990, Attorney General John Van de Kamp proposed the third campaign finance 
initiative submitted to the voters in two years. With the support of Ralph Nader and 
California Common Cause, Van de Kamp crafted an initiative addressing numerous 
aspects of political reform. It became an integral part of his gubernatorial campaign. The 
measure, whose campaign finance provisions resembled Proposition 68, qualified for the 
November 1990 ballot and was designated as Proposition 131, the "Clean Government 
Initiative." It contained the following provisions: 
• Term Limits. Elected statewide officials were limited to eight successive years in 
office and state legislators to twelve successive years. 
• Limited on gifts and honoraria for public officials. 
• Limited contributions from individuals to $1,000 per candidate per election cycle. 
Limited political committees to $2,500 per candidate, and broad-based political 
committees to $10,000. Political parties were prohibited from contributing more than 
116 of the applicable spending limit for the particular office being sought. 
• Prohibited non-election year contributions. 
• Required candidates to raise two-thirds of all contributions from individuals. 
• Limited Assembly candidates to spending $250,000 for a primary election and 
$400,000 for a general election. For Senate candidates, the limits were $425,000 for a 
primary election and $700,000 for a general election. 
• Public funds were to be provided by both General Fund appropriations and an income 
tax check-off program. 
Proposition 131 was defeated by a wide margin, 38% to 62%. 
m Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
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Legislative Reform Proposals (1989-1992) 
In the three legislative sessions since the passage of Propositions 68 and 73, the California 
Legislature has considered over forty separate campaign finance measures. None have 
passed and gone to the Governor. It has proved difficult to build a political coalition able 
to pass a comprehensive reform plan, particularly since a 213 vote is required to amend the 
Political Reform Act, unless changes are approved by the electorate. In 1992, two 
competing campaign finance reform measures were introduced: AB 2328, which was 
sponsored by thirteen Republican Members, and AB 2951, which was sponsored by five 
Democrats. 
• The Republican bill, AB 2328, was designed to simultaneously repeal and re-write the 
provisions of Proposition 73 that were ruled unconstitutional by the federal district 
court. The measure re-instated the Proposition 73 contribution limits but enforced 
them on an election cycle basis rather than a fiscal year basis. The bill also re-stated 
provisions prohibiting the use of public money for political campaigns and on mailing 
newsletters at public expense. The bill was defeated in committee. 
• The Democratic measure, AB 2951, also repealed provisions ofProposition 73, and 
created a complex comprehensive system of contribution limits, voluntary expenditure 
limits, and public financing. Contributions: The bill limited individual contributions to 
$1,000 per candidate per election. For political committees and small contributor 
political committees the limits were $2,500 and $5,000, respectively. Transfers of 
funds between candidates were prohibited and the total amount a candidate may raise 
from non-individuals was limited to 1/3 of the expenditure limits and from political 
parties to 1/6 of the expenditure limits. Spending Limits: To receive public funds, 
candidates had to agree to limit their spending. to $200,000 in the primary and 
$250,000 in the general election for Assembly candidates, $350,000 in the primary and 
$450,000 in the general election for Senate candidates, $1.3 million in the primary and 
$2.4 million in the general election for all statewide officials (other than Governor), 
and $4.5 million in the primary and $7.2 million in the general election for candidates 
for Governor. Candidates had to limit their personal expenditures to between $25,000 
and $100,000, depending on the office being sought. The bill contained a unique 
provision regarding independent expenditures. Candidates whose opponents had 
independent expenditures in excess of 1/6 of the spending limit made on their behalf 
could have their spending limits increased by that amount. Matching Funds: The bill 
established a system of 1 to 1 public matching funds for the first $250 of each 
contribution. The bill also established some unique disclosure provisions. The 
measure was defeated despite receiving a simple majority in the Assembly, 42-33. 
Even had it passed, AB 2951 would have taken effect only ifSCA 4 (Keene) had been 
passed by the Legislature and ratified by the voters. SCA 4 amended Article II of the 
California Constitution to require the Legislature to institute a system of comprehensive 
campaign financing including contribution and expenditure limits, limited public matching 
funds, and a prohibition on the transfer of campaign funds between candidates. The 
measure passed the Senate on a 28-6 vote, but was defeated 35-37 in the Assembly. 
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APPENDIX B: CURRENT SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE POLIDCAL 
REFORM ACT 
Disclosure Provisions: 
• Candidates, elected officers, and political committees are required to file semi-annual 
statements and two pre-election statements as specified before each primary and 
general election. 
• Ballot measure committees are required to file semi-annual statements and two 
statements prior to the election the measure appears on the ballot. 
• Candidates, elected officers, political committees, and ballot measure committees are 
required to report all contributions of $100 or more and the sum of all contributions 
under $100. 
• Any individual or committee making independent expenditures which total $500 or 
more must issue semi-annual reports which include detailed information for all 
expenditures in excess of$100. 
Campaign Finance Provisions: 
• Individuals, political committees, and political parties may make unlimited 
contributions to candidates for primary and general elections, political committees, and 
political parties. 
• Candidates in primary, general, and special elections may make unlimited expenditures. 
• Candidates, elected public officials, and their campaign committees may make 
unlimited transfers of funds to other candidates, elected public officials, and campaign 
committees. 
• Candidates, elected officials, political committees, and political parties may accept an 
unlimited amount and number of contributions during non-election years. 
• Candidates may carry-over an unlimited amount of campaign funds from one election 
to another, and from one year to another. 
• Candidates for public office may expend an unlimited amount of their personal or 
family funds on their own campaigns. 
• Individuals, political co111I'iuttees, and broad based political committees may make an 
unlimited number and amount of independent expenditures on behalf of candidates, 
political parties, ballot measures, or for other purposes. 
• Contributions to, and expenditures by, ballot measure campaigns are unlimited. 
• Special Elections: Individuals may contribute up to $1,000 per candidate; political 
committees may contribute a total of $2,500 or less; and broad based political 
committees may contribute up to a total of$5,000. 
• Candidates for public office are prohibited from accepting or expending public moneys 
for their campaigns. 
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APPENDIX C: SELECTED CAMPAIGN FINANCE LEGISLATION 
INTRODUCED IN mE 1993-94 REGULAR SESSION* 
Contribution Limits Legislation: 
SB 1693 (Campbell) 
SB 1693 would establish the most strict contribution limitations in the nation. The bill 
would prohibit candidates from soliciting or accepting any contribution for an election 
campaign in excess of $10, unless the contributor resides in the district of the office to 
which the candidate is seeking election. Constituent contributors may contribute up to 
$250. SB 1693 was defeated by the Senate Committee on Elections and 
Reapportionment. 
SB 1897 (Hayden) 
SB 1897 would prohibit any individual appointed to a board or commission by the 
Governor, Speaker of the Assembly, or the Senate Committee on Rules from soliciting 
contributions from anyone with business before that board or commission. Appointed 
officials would also be prohibited from engaging in fundraising activities which would 
benefit the appointing public official or committee member. SB 1897 was defeated by the 
Senate. 
AB 569 and ACA 4 (Friedman) 
These companion measures would limit off-year fundraising by all legislative and statewide 
candidates. Candidates would be prohibited from soliciting or receiving funds prior to 
October 1 for legislative candidates and July 1 for statewide candidates in the year before 
they seek election. The legislation would also lengthen the terms ofMembers of the 
Assembly from two to four years. Both bills were defeated by the Assembly Committee 
on Elections, Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments. 
AB 1343 (Johnson) 
AB 1343, is nearly identical to the provisions of AB 2328, introduced by Assembly 
Member Johnson in 1992 (See pg. All for discussion). AB 1343 was defeated by the 
Assembly Committee on Elections, Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments. 
AB 1761 (Frazee) 
AB 17 61 would prohibit political committees from making contributions to candidates for 
public office or making independent expenditures on their behalf. The legislation would 
restrict contributions from individuals to $1,000 per candidate and $1,000 per political 
party. Only individuals would be allowed to contribute to political parties. Political 
• Note: Bill descriptions and status are current as of July 1, 1994. 
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parties would be restricted to contributing $5,000 to candidates for the Assembly, $10,000 
to candidates for the Senate, $50,000 to candidates for the Board of Equalization, and 
$100,000 to all other statewide candidates. AB 1761 was referred to the Assembly 
Committee on Elections, Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments, where no 
action has been taken. 
AB 1993 (Bowen) 
AB 1993 would repeal all ofProposition 73, save the ban on publicly-funded mass 
mailings, and would establish individual contribution limits of$1,000 to candidates, 
committees, or political parties; $2,500 limits for political committees; and $5,000 limits 
for small contributor committees. The bill would limit the aggregate amounts which 
individuals, political committees, and small contributor committees may contribute in one 
two-year election cycle. Transfers between candidates, and non-election year fundraising 
would be prohibited. AB 1993 would also increase funding for the FPPC, and increase 
the maximum penalties for violations of Title IX from $2000 to $5,000 per violation. 
Detailed requirements are specified for the use of surplus campaign funds officeholder 
accounts. Independent expenditures by individuals or committees on behalf of candidates 
would be prohibited once an individual or committee has donated $500 or more to that 
candidate. AB 1993 was defeated by the Assembly Committee on Elections, 
Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments. 
AB 3224 (Jones) 
AB 3224 would repeal provisions of Proposition 73 declared unconstitutional by the 
federal courts, limit contributions by political parties to $5,000 and prohibit transfers of 
funds between candidates. The legislation would also prohibit all anonymous or cash 
contributions and off-year fundraising. AB 3224 was defeated by the Assembly Elections, 
Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments Committee by a 2-3 vote. 
ACA 41 (McPherson) 
ACA 41 is a statutory initiative requiring a 2/3 Legislative vote to be placed on the next 
statewide ballot. It would establish a campaign finance system including the following 
provisions: contribution limits; prohibitions on corporate and labor union contributions; a 
prohibition on public financing of state elections; and restrictions on the transfer of 
campaign funds. The contribution limits would be set at $1,000 per year from individuals, 
$2,500 per election cycle from political committees, and $5,000 per election cycle from 
broad-based political committees. ACA 41 is currently under consideration by the 
Assembly Elections, Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments Committee. 
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Expenditure Limits/Public Funding Legislation: 
AB 3631 (Karnette) 
AB 3631 addresses the current tax check-off system, including the California Election 
Campaign Fund which provides public money to political parties. This legislation would 
repeal all of the ten programs listed on tax returns which receive less than $100,000 in 
1996. If current check-off trends continue, the California Election Campaign Fund would 
probably gamer that amount of money. The legislation was passed by the Assembly 
Committee on Revenue and Taxation and is under consideration by the Assembly Ways 
and Means Committee. 
AC4 39 (Jones) 
ACA 39 would prohibit a county or city charter from authorizing the expenditure of public 
funds for political campaigns within their jurisdictions. The legislation is currently being 
considered by the Assembly Committee on Local Government. 
Comprehensive Legislation-(Includes Contribution Limits, Expenditure Limits, and 
Public Financing) 
SB 588 (Lockyer) and SC4 14 (Marks) 
SB 588, and its companion measure, SCA 14, proposed a system of comprehensive 
campaign finance for state legislative offices which includes contribution limits, 
expenditure limitations, public financing, and restrictions on independent expenditures. 
SCA 14 would have required the Legislature and Governor to establish such a system on 
or before December 31, 1995, but it was defeated in the Senate. SB 588 was then 
amended and is now a statutory initiative to be placed on the next statewide ballot for 
ratification if enacted. SB 588 has passed the Senate and is now on the Assembly floor. 
Contribution Limits: 
• SB 588 limits contributions from qualified organizations to $5,000 per state legislative 
candidate per election and from political parties to 1/3 of the applicable spending limit. 
All other contributions would be limited to $2,000. 
• State legislative candidates would be allowed to raise up to $20,000 (for Assembly 
candidates) or $40,000 (for Senate candidates) in "seed money" which would not be 
subject to the limitations. 
• The bill prohibits transfers between candidates. 
Matching Public Funds and Expenditure Limits: 
• In order to receive public matching funds, candidates would have to raise a specified 
amount of money, be opposed on the ballot, and agree to abide by expenditure limits 
based on the average number of registered voters per district in California. 
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• Assembly candidates could spend no more than $1.75 per registered voter for the 
general election. Senate candidates would be limited to $1.50 for the general election. 
• Public funds for qualifYing candidates would be provided through a tax check-off 
system for the general election only. 
• Contributions would be matched 4 to 1 for the first $1 00, 3 to 1 for any amount 
between $101 and $500, and 2 to 1 for any amount between $501 and $1,000. 
• Independent expenditures on behalf of a candidate by anyone contributing more than 
$100 to that candidate would be prohibited. 
SB 878 (Hayden) 
SB 878 would create a very stringent comprehensive campaign financing system. The bill 
would prohibit all political contributions in excess of$100. Candidates would be eligible 
to receive matching funds in exchange for agreeing to abide by expenditure limits. The 
limits would be set at the following levels: for Assembly candidates, $100,000 for the 
primary election and $150,000 for the general election; for Senate candidates, $150,000 
for the primary election and $225,000 for the general election; for Gubernatorial 
candidates, $1 million for the primary election and $1.8 million for the general election; for 
all other statewide offices, $250,000 for the primary election and $450,000 for the general 
election. The Legislature would appropriate $5 million of State General Funds to finance 
the matching funds program. SB 878 is in the Senate Committee on Elections and 
Reapportionment. 
SCA JJ (Lockyer) 
SCA 13 would add Section 21 to Article II of the California Constitution requiring the 
Legislature to enact a system of campaign financing prior to 1995 which would contain: 
contribution limits, expenditure limitations, and partial public funding for state legislative 
candidates. The bill differs from SCA 14 (Marks) because it also requires the Legislature 
to establish provisions governing the use of non-campaign officeholder expense accounts 
and to set contribution limits for local officials. The bill is in the Senate Committee on 
Elections and Reapportionment. 
SCA 21 (Hayden) 
SCA 21 would add sections to Article II of the California Constitution. It would prohibit 
candidates for state office from accepting campaign contributions in excess of$1,000 from 
individuals, $2,500 from political committees, and $5,000 from small contributor 
committees. The bill would prohibit candidates from soliciting or accepting contributions 
before October 1 of the year prior to that in which the candidate is seeking election. The 
transfer of funds to other candidates or campaign committees would be prohibited. The 
legislation requires the creation of a public matching funds program whereby the first $250 
of contributions would be matched. To receive matching funds, candidates would have to 
agree to expenditure limits set at varied rates depending on the office being sought. SCA 
21 is in the Senate Committee on Elections and Reapportionment. 
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AB 3694 (Bowen) 
AB 3694, which would be placed on the ballot as a statutory initiative, is similar to AB 
1993, also introduced by Assembly Member Bowen. The two bills differ in one respect. 
AB 3694 would create a Legislative Election Fund paid for with income tax check-offs 
which would provide public funds to qualified candidates facing wealthy opponents. 
Candidates would be eligible to receive one dollar for ever dollar in personal money spent 
by his or her opponent. AB 3694 was defeated by the Assembly Elections, 
Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments Committee. 
A CA 12 (Sher) 
ACA 12 would amend Article N of the California Constitution to require the California 
Legislature and Governor to enact a system of campaign financing which would include 
contribution limits, expenditure limitations, restrictions on the transfer of funds, and 
limited public financing. The bill passed the Assembly Committee on Elections, 
Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments, and is currently in the Assembly 
inactive file. 
Campaign Disclosure Legislation: 
SB 758 (Hayden) 
SB 758 would require any committee receiving contributions or making campaign 
expenditures totaling $30,000 or more, to file their campaign disclosure statements on 
computer diskette as well as hard copy. The Secretary of State would be required to 
establish a system whereby all campaign contribution records would be recorded in a 
computer database and made electronically available to the public through the Internet and 
through traditional print methods by January 1996. The information would be available to 
any individual with access to a computer bulletin board or through public libraries. SB 
758 was passed by the Senate but was defeated in the Assembly Elections, 
Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments Committee. 
AB 2052 (Margolin) 
AB 2052 would broaden disclosure requirements for political committees. Currently, the 
Political Reform Act requires all committees making campaign contributions or 
independent expenditures to file periodic campaign statements. This bill would similarly 
require political committees to disclose payments to slate mailer organizations. AB 2052 
was passed by the Assembly and is currently in the Senate inactive file. 
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AB 2220 (Martinez) 
AB 2220 would increase the maximum monetary penalty for violation of the Political 
Reform Act from $2,000 to $4,000. This bill has been passed by the Assembly and is 
being considered by the Senate Elections and Reapportionment Committee. 
AB 2SOJ (Bowler, Conroy, Honeycutt, and Richter) 
AB 2503 would require a candidate or committee which makes a late campaign 
contribution or late independent expenditure to include in their late contribution report the 
date and amount of that contribution along with the cumulative amount 'Contributed to or 
spent on behalf of the recipient candidate or ballot committee. AB 2503 passed the 
Assembly but was defeated by the Senate Committee on Elections and Reapportionment. 
AB 2504 (Bowler) 
AB 2504 would require candidates or campaign committees to return any contribution of 
$500 or more which does not specify the occupation and employer of the contributor. AB 
2504 was defeated 3-3 by the Assembly Elections, Reapportionment, and Constitutional 
Amendments Committee. 
AB Jl81 (Costa) 
AB 3181 amends the system for qualifYing initiatives for the ballot. It also requires 
committees supporting or opposing the qualification of an initiative to file additional 
campaign statements 30 days after the initiative is titled and 21 days after a petition is 
filed. This bill requires all late contribution reports filed by contributors, candidates, and 
committees to include the cumulative total of all contributions made to the recipient 
candidate or ballot committee. AB 3181 passed the Assembly and was reported out by 
Senate Committee on Elections and Reapportionment. 
AB J611 (Moore) 
AB 3611 would require the Secretary of State to develop a program which utilizes 
electronic information processing and dissemination technology to improve the availability 
of campaign disclosure information. The bill requires that the Secretary of State issue a 
report on the scope and cost ofthe program by July 1995. AB 3611 was passed by the 
Assembly Elections, Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments Committee and is 
currently being considered by the Assembly Ways and Means Committee. 
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APPENDIX D: CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN SELECTED JURISDICTIONS 
Contribution Limits 
San Diego, California 
San Diego has one of the most stringent contribution limit schemes in the nation. The San 
Diego Municipal Election Campaign Control Ordinance was enacted in 1973. The 
purpose of the ordinance is to "preserve an orderly political forum in which individuals 
may express themselves effectively~ (and) to place realistic and enforceable limits on the 
amounts of money that may be contributed to political campaigns in municipal 
elections." 127 In order to accomplish this, candidates are allowed to accept contributions 
from individuals in amounts not exceeding $250 per election cycle. Contributions from 
other sources are prohibited, including from corporations, unions, political committees, 
and political parties. 
A recent study conducted by the San Diego Elections, Campaign and Governmental Ethics 
Advisory Board evaluated the effectiveness of the city's campaign finance ordinance, and 
made recommendations for further reform. The study found that while "campaign 
spending in San Diego municipal elections has not historically been subject to the excess 
evident in California state and federal elections,"128 the ordinance creates a number of 
unintended consequences. Specifically, the stringent contribution limits are "badly 
outdated ... fail to take into account inflation, and give wealthy candidates an unfair 
advantage over the less well-funded. It disadvantages less well-known challengers with a 
more limited base of donors in favor of wealthy individuals and better known 
incumbents." 129 Because Buckley v. Valeo prohibits restrictions of the amount of money 
candidates may contribute to their own campaigns, personal money plays a large role in 
San Diego elections. 130 In order to rectify this problem, the Board recommended raising 
the limits to $3 50 per election. In addition, the Board suggested prohibiting non-election 
year fundraising by mayoral and city council candidates in order to encourage competition. 
Expenditure Limits 
West Virginia 
In 1987, West Virginia enacted the first voluntary expenditure limit program not 
supported by public financing. The restrictions comprise a significant portion of a Code of 
Fair Campaign Practices and grew out of a failure by the state Legislature to adopt binding 
statutory restrictions on campaign spending and $1,000 contribution limits. 131 Under the 
current system, candidates for state and federal office may sign the Code, which includes a 
127 Government Code Section 81002 (a). 
128 Buckley v. Valeo 1976. 
129 San Diego Municipal Code §27.2901 
130 The City of San Diego Elections, Campaign, and Governmental Ethics Advisory Board 1993. 
131 Alexander, Goss, and Schwartz 1992. 
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pledge to refrain from issuing slanderous or distorted campaign advertising, and which 
states "I personally support a limit on campaign expenditures that, when reasonable, 
sufficient, and fairly applied, does not limit or restrict the expression of ideas of the 
candidate or others on behalf of the candidate, but instead challenges individuals to engage 
in open dialogue on the issues rather than merely to pursue the excessive repetition of 
images and slogans. Accordingly, I adhere to the following limits on campaign 
spending." 132 The limits, per election, are as follows.133 
U.S. Senate-------------·--··--------·------------·---·---------------$1 000 000 
, ' 
U.S. House of Representatives -------------------------$333,333 
Governor---------------------------····--------------------$1,000,000 
Other Constitutional Officers--------------------$100,000 
Supreme Court----------------------------------------------- $125,000 
State Senate -------------------------------------------------------------------- $25,000 
House of Delegates----------------------------------------------------------------------- $12,500 
Circuit Judge--------------------------------------------------------------------------- $25,000 
Candidates exceeding the limits are not liable for fines or legal sanctions: "if a candidate 
violates the Code's limits, it allows an opposition candidate to point to that.. .. The only 
sanctions are the sanctions of the news media and the opposing candidate." 134 Although 
no gubernatorial candidates have agreed to limit their spending since the Code was 
implemented, state officials report that spending has "dipped dramatically" in state 
legislative campaigns since the Code was adopted. In its first year of operation (1988) 
nearly 75 percent of successful legislative candidates abided by the self-imposed limits, 
while about a third of candidates have agreed since. 135 
Vermont 
Vermont became the second state to pass legislation creating a system of voluntary 
expenditure limits not accompanied by public financing in 1992. Under the Vermont act, 
candidates are required to file a statement voluntarily accepting or declining specified 
expenditure limits, and a pledge not to solicit independent expenditures on or before 
August 1 for the September primary election. The limits vary depending on the office 
being sought and the status of the candidates. For each of the specified levels, challengers 
are allowed to spend 110 percent of the listed amounts. Gubernatorial candidates are 
limited to expending no more than $400,000 combined in the primary and general 
elections, while other statewide candidates are limited to spending between $40,000 and 
$100,000 depending on the office. Vermont places amazingly low spending limits on 
legislative candidates. State Senators are restricted to spending no more than $4,000 for 
both the primary and general elections, while State Representatives from single member 
districts are limited to $2,000, and Representatives from double member districts to 
132 State of West Virginia Code of Fair Campaign Practices . 
. 
133 For example, Senate candidates may spend $50,000 for the primary and general elections combined. 
134 West Virginia Secretary of State Ken Heschler in Institute for Southern Studies, 1993. 
m Institute of Southern Studies, 1993. 
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$3,000. Two weeks after pledges are filed with the Secretary of State, a list of candidates 
accepting limits is issued by the Secretary of State. Candidates agreeing to the limits and 
then exceeding the amounts are required to remit the extra amount to the state general 
fund within ninety days after the election or be fined by the Secretary of State. 
The effectiveness of expenditure limits by themselves seem to be limited. Without public 
subsidies or any other incentive for limiting spending, save possible public approval, most 
candidates are unlikely to limit their spending. Furthermore, although the expenditure 
limits are voluntary, because candidates are not offered public funds, in accordance with 
Supreme Court mandates, this program might be ruled unconstitutional. 136 New 
Hampshire, which has a similar program, waives high candidate filing fees and signature 
requirements for candidates accepting voluntary limits in order to pass the constitutionality 
test without actually distributing public funds. Lastly, the enforcement provisions of the 
Vennont act are exceptionally weak. Candidates who choose initially to limit their 
spending and then exceed these limits, might simply engage in fundraising after the 
election to avoid a fine. 
Variable Contribution Limits 
Oakland, California 
In 1993, Oakland adopted a unique blend of contribution limits and expenditure limits. 
Finding that large contributors were having an increasingly "disproportionate or 
controlling influence on the election of candidates ... (causing) the public perception that 
votes are being improperly influenced by monetary contributions (and that) raising large 
amounts of money distracts officeholders from important public matters,11137 the Oakland 
City Council crafted The City of Oakland Campaign Reform Act. 
The measure, which will take effect for the 1994 elections, is designed to limit both 
fundraising and spending for Mayor, City Council, City Auditor,.and School Board 
primary and general elections without appropriating public funds. The Act contains 
voluntary expenditure limits based on the current salary of city council members and the 
mayor. Candidates agreeing to the expenditure limits are allowed to accept contributions 
at higher levels than candidates choosing not to limit their spending. 
Candidates who refuse to limit their expenditures are prohibited from receiving individual 
contributions in amounts not to exceed $100 per election, and contributions more than 
$250 from broad based political committees. In contrast, candidates who voluntarily 
participate in the program are prohibited from accepting contributions in excess of $500 
from individuals and $1,000 from broad based political committee per election. Partisan 
transfers are permitted within contribution limits for all candidates. In exchange for the 
ability to raise funds in larger amounts, City Council and School Board candidates must 
restrict their spending to 300 percent of the salary of a city council member for the 
136 See discussion of expenditure limitations and public financing, pg. 33. 
137 City of Oakland Ordinance No. 11612 C.M.S. "The City of Oakland Campaign Reform Act". 
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primary election and 250 percent for the general election (approximately $50,000 and 
$42,000, respectively). City Auditor and Council Member-At-Large candidates are 
limited to 500 percent of a council member's salary for the primary election and 400 
percent for the general election (approximately $85,000 and $67,000, respectively) .. 
Mayoral candidates are limited to 300 percent of the mayor's salary for the primary and 
250 percent for the general (approximately $240,000 and $200,000, respectively). 
While the Oakland Act is being implemented for the first time in the 1994 elections, there 
is a chance that the measure might be ruled unconstitutional. The expenditure limits might 
pass Supreme Court muster, but contribution limits appear to violate the intent of the 
Buckley v. Va/eo decision, in which contribution limits are permitted only for the purpose 
of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. The variable contribution limit 
system suggests that money is corrupting at one level for certain candidates but at a higher 
level for other candidates. 
New Hampshire currently operates a system of variable contribution limits while 
Washington voters rejected a similar plan in a 1992 campaign reform initiative. Rhode 
Island and Kentucky have recently enacted laws that include expenditure limits and both 
variable contribution limits and public financing in case the variable limits are ruled 
unconstitutional. 138 
Public Financing Without Expenditure Limits 
Massachusetts 
In 1975, Massachusetts implemented a system of voluntary public funding without 
expenditure limits for statewide election campaigns. The program is funded through a tax 
add-on system. Public participation.rates hover around 2 percent. 139 However, because 
the program is available only to statewide candidates, the fund builds during the four year 
cycle between elections, and adequately funds the program. 
In order to qualify for the program, candidates must receive a threshold amount of money 
in contributions of $250 or less. Unlike most public financing systems, candidates are 
eligible to receive funds for both the primary and general elections. However, candidates 
are required to raise threshold amounts for each election. Gubernatorial candidates are 
required to raise $75,000 for the primary election and $125,000 for the general election to 
qualify for matching funds. Levels for other statewide candidates are considerably lower. 
Depending on the office and the election, candidates receiving public funds must raise 
between $15,000 and $62,500 in small contributions. 
The program was initially begun to ensure that spending would not be excessively 
restricted after the imposition of contribution limits. Massachusetts restricts contributions 
to candidates or any political committee from individuals, political action committees, 
138 Common Cause State Issue Brief, 1993. 
139 Alexander, Goss, and Schwartz, 1992. 
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political parties, and partisan transfers. Under state law, individuals and P ACs are 
prohibited from contributing in excess of$1,000 per candi<late per calendar year. Political 
parties are limited to $3,000 per candidate per calendar year. Partisan transfers are capped 
at $100 each. 
Allocation of the public campaign fund depends upon taxpayer participation in the 
program and the aggregate amount raised. However, state law specifies that 60 percent of 
the fund be used for the primary election and 40 percent be used for the general. 
Qualifying candidates receive matching funds for contributions of $250 or less up to a 
specified maximum amount. Prior to 1990, when the campaign fund was at an especially 
low level, candidates did not routinely reach the maximum funding level. However, all 
candidates receiving public funds in 1992 maxed out on public funds. The program 
reached its maximum funding levels in 1986, when the gubernatorial candidates received a 
total of$270,000 and candidates for attorney general campaign received $250,000 for the 
two elections. 
Comprehensive Campaign Finance Systems 
Minnesota 
Minnesota was the first state to adopt a comprehensive system of public financing for both 
state legislative and gubernatorial candidates, in its Ethics in Government Act of 1974. In 
addition to unique contribution limits, expenditure limits, and public financing, the bill 
created substantial campaign and lobbying disclosure provisions, and a State Ethical 
Practices Board. Due to an exceptionally high participation rate by candidates, the 
Minnesota system is typically considered a model for other states. In 1992, 441 of the 457 
candidate eligible for public funding accepted expenditure limits in exchange for the funds. 
This 97 percent acceptance rate has actually grown from a low of 88 percent in 1988.140 
For this reason it is worthwhile to examine the Minnesota system in detail. 
Contribution Limits: 
• Candidates for Governor and Lieutenant Governor, who run as a team, may not accept 
contributions from individuals or political committees in excess of$20,000 during a 
given election year, or $3,000 in all other years. They are also prohibited from 
accepting contributions from political parties in excess of$100,000 during an election 
year and $15,000 during a non-election year. 
• Candidates for Attorney General may receive up to $10,000 in an election year and 
$2,000 in a non-election year from individuals and political committees, and $50,000 
in an election year and $10,000 in a non-election year from political parties. 
• All other statewide executive candidates are limited to half the allowable limits for 
Attorney General. 
• State Senate candidates are prohibited from accepting contributions over $1,500 in an 
election year and $500 in an election year from individuals and political committees 
140 Ibid. 
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and $7,500 in an election year and $2,500 in a non-election year from political parties. 
State Representative candidates are limited to half the limits for State Senate. 
Voluntary Expenditure Limits: 
Candidates accepting public funds in exchange for spending limits are prohibited from 
spending more than the following amounts per calendar year (to be annually adjusted each 
year based on the Consumer Price Index): 
• Candidates for Governor and Lieutenant Governor are limited to approximately 
$1,700,000 during an election year and 25 percent ofthe expenditure limit in a non-
election year. 
• Candidates for Attorney General are limited to approximately $275,000 during an 
election year and 25 percent of the expenditure limit in a non-election year. 
• Other state executive office candidates (Secretary of State, Treasurer, and Auditor) 
are limited to approximately $140,000 during an election year and 25 percent of the 
expenditure limit in a non-election year. 
• State Senate candidates are limited to approximately $42,000 during an election year 
and 25 percent of the expenditure limit in a non-election year. 
• Candidates for State Representative are limited to approximately $22,000 during an 
election year and 25 percent of the expenditure limit in a non-election year. 
There are two exceptions to these limits. First, if a primary candidate wins a primary 
election with less than twice as many votes as the second place finisher, a "close primary 
rule" allows that candidate to spend a total of 125 percent of the limit during that election 
year. Second, if a candidate accepting public financing is opposed by a candidate who 
qualifies for public funds but does not join the program, the first candidate's expenditure 
limits are lifted. 
Public Financing: 
Minnesota's public financing provisions are supported by a tax check-off system whereby 
taxpayers can designate up to $5 to be placed in the State Elections Campaign Fund. 
Contributions may be designated to either a specified political party fund or a general 
candidate account. To be eligible, candidates must agree to limit their expenditures and 
must raise contributions equal to 20 percent of the limit by October 1 of the election year. 
Funds from the general account are dispersed to candidates in November after election 
results have been certified. In addition statewide candidates must receive 5 percent of the 
vote and state legislative candidates 10 percent of the vote in the general election in order 
to receive public funds. 
Once candidates are certified to receive funds, the general candidate account is 
apportioned by the Ethical Practices Board based on the following proportions: 70 percent 
of the general campaign funds are divided equally among state legislative candidates, 21 
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percent among gubernatorial candidates, and 9 percent among the remaining executive 
office candidates. 
Funds from the political party account are dispersed in October after primary results are 
certified. 10 percent of the funds in the party account are allocated directly to the state 
parties as specified by taxpayer check-offs. 70 percent are allocated to the winners of 
state legislative primaries depending on the amount of money checked off in the 
candidates' district. This results in substantial variability between candidates across the 
state. The remaining 20 percent of the funds are allocated to statewide candidates, with 
gubernatorial candidates receiving 14 percent of the political party account. The twin 
account system thus allows taxpayers either to designate funds for general distribution or 
based on partisan identification. Distribution of money based on this system was as 
follows for the 1990 election: 141 
Office 
Governor!Lt. Governor 
Attorney General 
Secretary of State 
State Auditor 
State Treasurer 
State Senate 
State Assembly 
Democratic 
$408,231 
$69,983 
$34,991 
$34,991 
$34,991 
$716,662 
$469,497 
Republican 
$0 
$56,983 
$28,491 
$28,491 
$28,491 
$574,388 
$367,736 
A special report published in April 1992, "Bankrolling the Legislature" highlighted flaws in 
the Minnesota campaign finance system. The report found that because "Minnesota has 
never restricted how much special interest money candidates can rake in even if they 
accept public financing ... special interests are pumping more and more money into 
campaigns and getting results."142 According to the report, "special interest" contributions 
have quadrupled during the sixteen year history of the program while public financing 
increased by 600 percent. The report referred to a loophole in the campaign finance law 
allows special interests to avoid contribution limits by contributing significant amounts to 
"Friends of. ... " committees that are separate from candidate campaign committees and not 
subject to regulation under state law. In addition, public financing provisions have 
disproportionately benefited incumbents in politically safe districts, including 24 legislators 
who were unopposed during the 1992 election. The report recommended: 
• Limiting the aggregate sum of PAC contributions which a candidate may collect~ 
• Prohibiting candidates from creating numerous fundraising committees~ 
• Banning partisan transfers; and 
• Encouraging contributions from small individual donors through tax breaks or a 
matching funds system. 
141 Ibid. 
142 St. Paul Pioneer Press, 1992. 
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Wisconsin 
Wisconsin became the second state to institute a comprehensive campaign finance 
program for state legislative candidates and statewide officials in 1978. The law is unique 
because certain provisions, such as disclosure and contribution limits, apply to all state 
and local elections. Further, while public funds are provided only for the general election, 
expenditure limits apply to both the primary and general elections. 
Contribution Limits: 
• Statewide candidates are prohibited from accepting contributions from individuals in 
excess of$10,000; State Senate candidates are limited to $1,000; and State Assembly 
candidates are limited to $500. Certain judicial candidates may accept between $1,000 
and $3,000 depending on the office and local candidates are limited to $250. 
• Political action committees may contribute much more than individuals to statewide 
candidates. The maximum PAC contribution is 4 percent of applicable expenditure 
limits. Gubernatorial candidates are prohibited from receiving contributions in excess 
of$43,128. Contributions to other statewide officials are capped between $8,625 and 
$21,564 depending on the office. PAC contributions to legislative candidates have the 
same limits as for individual contributions ($1,000 for State Senate candidates and 
$500 for State Assembly candidates). Legislative candidates may not accept more 
than 45 percent of the expenditure limit in PAC contributions. 
• While contributions from political parties are not explicitly capped at a certain level, 
candidates may not accept more than 65 percent of the expenditure limits from a 
combination ofPAC and partisan sources. 
• Corporations and labor unions are prohibited from making contributions. 
Voluntary Expenditure Limits: 
The following spending limits apply to both the primary and general election combined: 
• Gubernatorial candidates- $1,078,200. 
• Lieutenant Governor candidates- $323,475. 
• Candidates for Attorney General- $539,000. 
• All other statewide candidate- $215,625. 
• State Senate candidates- $34,500, (not to exceed $21,575 in either the primary or 
general election). 
• State Assembly candidates- $17,250 (not to exceed $10,775 in either election). 
• Candidates for local and county office are restricted to specified expenditure amounts 
based upon the population of their jurisdiction or district. 
Public Financing: 
• In order to receive public funds for the general election, a candidate must have won 
the primary election, received at least 6 percent of the total votes cast for that office in 
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the primary election143, face an opponent, and receive at least 5-10 percent of the 
expenditure limits in contributions of $100 or less depending on the office being 
sought. · 
• Candidates are entitled to the maximum 45 percent public funding grant only if they 
have not received PAC contributions. Public funding decreases in proportion to PAC 
funding. 
Funds are raised through a $1 tax check-off system. Three fourths of the money raised is 
appropriated to a legislative account and 25 percent is apportioned to an executive 
account. However, due to a decline in tax filer designations, insufficient funds are raised 
to fund all candidates to maximum grant level. Instead, all qualifying candidates may 
receive up to a certain portion of the available funds. For example, in 1990, all qualifYing 
State Senate candidates received up to the maximum public funding amount, while the 
maximum grants for statewide officials dropped significantly (from $485,190 to $303,269 
for gubernatorial candidates).l44 
In 1993, the Wisconsin Legislative Council created a Special Committee on Campaign 
Financing to study the effectiveness of this system and suggest possible reforms. The 
Special Committee uncovered a series of significant problems and proposed a massive 
restructuring of the campaign financing system. 
Contribution Limits: The Committee found that limits on campaign contributions were 
not sufficient to ensure "public trust in the integrity of the election process" and also 
disproportionally benefited incumbents. 145 The Committee proposed to: 
• Reduce the amount that individuals and political committees may contribute by 50 
percent; 
• Prevent the "bundling" of individual contributions; and 
• Eliminate fundraising by elected officeholders from the date of inauguration until the 
passage of the biennial budget bill. 
Expenditure Limits: The Committee found that expenditure limits were set at excessively 
low levels, "inadequate to enable candidates to conduct effective campaigns in competitive 
races, thereby reducing opportunities for the electorate to be informed regarding 
candidates and issues."l46 Further, these expenditure limits disproportionately discriminate 
against challengers. Finally, because of low limits, candidates were increasingly opting out 
of the voluntary program. In 1990, just 2/3 of eligible candidates agreed to limit their 
spending, and the Republican candidate for Governor became the first major party 
gubernatorial candidate to refuse the program. In order to address these issues, the 
Committee proposed to: 
143 This provision is designed to regulate the number of minor party candidates eligible for public funds. 
144 Wisconsin Legislative Council, 1992. 
14S Ibid. 
146Jbid. 
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• Raise expenditure levels significantly, to $2 million for gubernatorial candidates, 
between $250,00 and $700,000 for other statewide candidates, and $80,000 and 
$40,000 for Senate and Assembly candidates, respectively. 
• Allow challengers to spend 125 percent of the new limits while restricting incumbents 
and open seat candidates to the specified amounts. 
Public Funding: The Committee found that minor parties had been nearly shut out of 
public funding. Further, wealthy candidates and candidates supported by independent 
expenditures had a significant advantage in elections. The committee proposed: 
• Eliminate the requirement that candidates receive 6 percent of the total primary vote to 
become eligible for public funds. 
• Allow candidates whose opponent has independent expenditures made on his or her 
behalf to spend an identical amount in excess of the expenditure levels. 
• Raise the tax check-off level from $1 to $3 to fully fund public financing provisions. 
The Committee's recommendations were defeated by the Legislature. 
Hawaii 
Hawaii became the third state to provide public funding to both gubernatorial and state 
legislative candidates in 1979. However, Hawaii's campaign financing system differs 
dramatically from its predecessors as the strength of Hawaii's program is its contribution 
limits, which encourage a reliance on state political parties. 
Contribution Limits: 
• Contributions from individuals, corporations, labor unions, and independent 
committees are limited to $2,000 per candidate per election. 
• Limits on political parties are much less stringent. Political parties may contribute up 
to 20 percent of the spending limit for gubernatorial candidates, 30 percent to State 
Senate candidates, and 40 percent to candidates for State Representative. 
• A constitutionally questionable provision prohibits candidates and their immediate 
family members from contributing in excess of$50,000 to their political campaigns. 
This appears to violate First Amendment protections as outlined by the Court in 
Buckley v. Valeo. 
• Candidates for state legislative office and local offices (such as mayor, city council, or 
local board of education) are limited to only one fundraising event that costs more 
than $25 per person to attend. 
Voluntary Expenditure Limits: 
Candidates voluntarily accepting spending limits are restricted to spending levels based on 
the number of registered voters in their district in the previous statewide general election. 
Because legislative district sizes and registration levels vary, spending limits vary 
substantially between state legislative candidates. 
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• Gubernatorial candidates are limited to spending $1.25 per registered voter. 
• Lieutenant Governor and State legislative candidates may spend $. 70 per registered 
voter. 
• County Board ofEducation and other local candidates may spend only $.10 per 
registered voter. 
• Fundraising costs are not subject to the limits. 
Public Financing: 
• Public funds are available for both the primary and general elections. 
• Candidates must raise a threshold amount of money in contributions of $100 or less to 
qualify for public funds. Threshold amounts vary depending on the office being sought 
($1,000 for state legislative candidates to $25,000 for gubernatorial candidates). 
• Candidates for Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Mayor receive public matching 
funds at a 1-1 ratio up to 20 percent of the applicable spending limit. All other 
qualifying candidates for elective office who agree to limit their spending are allocated 
$250 for each elections. 
• Public funds are raised through a $2 tax check-off system. Hawaii has the highest 
participation rate in the country: 30 percent of taxpayers typically designate money to 
a political fund.1 47 
Because Hawaii's spending limits are very restrictive and public funding levels are small, 
few candidates voluntarily limit their spending. Between 1984 and 1988, just ten 
candidates agreed to limit their spending out of 191 elections. After the public funding 
level was increased from $50 to $250 per election in 1990, eighteen legislative candidates 
participated in the program. 
Seattle, Washington 
Seattle was the first major municipality in the United States to adopt a comprehensive 
campaign finance system in 1978. The program was in effect for the 1979 and 1981 
elections, was terminated by a sunset clause in 1981, reinstated in 1984 for the 1987 
election, and was superseded in 1992 by a statewide initiative. Initiative 134, which 
prohibits the use of public funds for state and local elections, eliminated Seattle's authority 
to implement its comprehensive system, which included partial public financing in 
exchange for voluntary expenditure limits. Seattle's strict contribution limits remain in 
effect, however. Thus, the 1994 elections will provide an interesting test of contribution 
limits and will provide a meaningful comparison with previous elections in Seattle. 
Provisions of the original comprehensive Seattle Campaign Finance Program included: 
Contribution Limits: 
• All contributions to candidates for public office, regardless of the source, are limited to 
$350 in a campaign year. Off-year contributions are prohibited. 
147 Alexander, Goss, and Schwartz, 1992. 
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Voluntary Expenditure Limits: 
Candidates receiving public matching funds may not spend more than the following 
amounts over a four year election cycle: 
• Mayoral candidates- $250,000. 
• All other city candidates (City Attorney, City Comptroller, City Treasurer, and the 
City Council)- $110,000. 
Public Financing: 
• Public funds are available for both the primary and general elections. 
• To become eligible for public financing, mayoral candidates must collect $30,000 and 
other city candidates $20,000 in contributions of$100 or less. 
• Qualifying city candidates receive public matching funds at a 1-1 ratio ofup to $50 per 
contribution. 
• Originally, matching funds were appropriated from the City of Seattle General Fund. 
When the program was re-instituted in 1984, the ordinance was amended to allow 
taxpayers to designate up to $4 of their annual tax liability to a city election fund. The 
check-off appeared on the annual municipal electrical utility bill. 
The City of Seattle Office of Election Administration evaluated the city's campaign finance 
system in 1988. The report identifies key quantifiable objectives: 
• Encouraging small individual contributions~ 
• Mitigating the influence of large contributors; and 
• Encouraging public participation in the electoral process. 
The system met these objectives in closely contested city elections during the 1979 and 
1981 elections, primarily by encouraging candidates to seek small contributors. The study 
discovered that: 
• There was a substantial decrease in the average contribution size; 
• A decrease in the number of contributions exceeding $1 00; 
• A corresponding increase in the number of contributions under $1 00; and 
• An increase in the total number of contributors. 
When the matching fund system was eliminated for the 1983 election, these trends 
reversed: large contributions increased and small individual contributions returned to 
previously low levels. Interestingly, when the ordinance was re-instated in 1987, many of 
these trends again reversed: the proportion oflarger contributions decreased, and the 
average size of contributions decreased. The study concludes from this data that Seattle's 
public financing system largely met its stated objectives.l48 
148 Miller, 1988. 
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Los Angeles, California 
The Los Angeles City Council approved City Charter Section 312 in 1985. The measure 
limits large contributions in city elections. Since that time, campaign finance provisions 
have been gradually added by city council and citizen-sponsored initiatives, creating the 
most comprehensive campaign financing system in California. In June of 1990, voters 
passed Measure H, which created the Los Angeles Ethics Commission, established 
considerable ethics regulations, provided a substantial salary increase for local officials, 
and instituted public financing for local elections. The stated purpose of the measure was 
to reduce campaign spending, decrease the influence of special interests, and increase 
competition in city elections. The measure was immediately challenged in court as a 
violation of Proposition 73's ban on public funding of California elections. The California 
Supreme Court upheld its validity in 1992, allowing it to take effect. The Court ruled that 
the California Constitution gives charter cities the right to legislate municipal affairs: 
"Proposition 73's prohibition on public financing does not preclude the City of Los 
Angeles from adopting and enforcing the public funding provisions of its campaign reform 
measure."l5° Counties do not have similar independent authority, however. The Court 
previously invalidated Sacramento County's public financing ordinance on the grounds that 
state law prevails over a conflicting county law in matters in which authority is not 
specifically delegated to counties in the California Constitution.1S1 The provisions of Los 
Angeles' campaign finance system are as follows: 
Contribution Limits: 
• Limited all contributions to candidates for citywide elected office to $1,000 per 
election. Contributions to City Council candidates are capped at $250 per election. 
• Restricted candidates in the aggregate amount of money they may raise from non-
individuals (PACs, political parties, labor unions, and corporations). Mayoral 
candidates may not accept more than $900,000, while other citywide officials are 
limited to 400,000, and City Council candidates are limited to $150,000. (If the 
Matching Funds Trust Fund does not contain enough money to fully subsidize all of 
the qualifYing candidates up to the maximum level, this provision is discarded.) 
• Permits citywide candidates to raise funds only during a period beginning twenty-four 
months prior to an election and ending three months after that election. City Council 
candidates may only receive contributions eighteen months prior to and three months 
after an election. 
• Permits candidates to transfer campaign funds to political parties, ballot measure 
committees, and non-city candidates, but may not transfer contributions to other 
candidates for Los Angeles elected office. 
• If a candidate participating in the matching funds program is opposed by an opponent 
who contributes in excess of $30,000 of personal funds to his or her campaign, the 
participating candidate may raise the identical amount in contributions not subject to 
the above limits. 
ISO Ross Johnson v. Tom Bradley, 1992. 
lSI County of Sacramento v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 1990. 
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Voluntary Expenditure Limits: 
Candidates who voluntarily accept spending limits in exchange for matching public funds 
are restricted to the following spending levels: 
• Mayoral candidates- $2 million for a primary election and $1.6 million for a run-off 
election. 
• Candidates for other citywide offices- between $800,000 and $900,000 for a primary 
election and $600,000 and $700,000 for a run-off election, depending on the office. 
• City Council candidates- $300,000 for a primary and $250,000 for a run-off election. 
• The costs of complying with campaign finance provisions, such as bookkeeping, legal 
services, and accounting, may reach up to 20 percent of the expenditure ceilings 
without counting toward total expenditures. 
• If a candidate refuses to participate and spends more than the applicable spending 
limits, or benefits from large independent expenditures,- the opposing candidate may 
receive public funds without following spending limits. 
Public Financing: 
• Public funds are available to qualifying candidates for both the primary and run-off 
elections. 
• To qualify, citywide candidates must raise a threshold amount of money in 
contributions of $500 or less. City Council candidates must raise a threshold amount 
in contributions of$250 or less. Threshold amounts vary from $150,000 for mayoral 
candidates to $25,000 for City Council candidates. 
• To qualify, a candidate must be opposed by a candidate who qualifies for the program 
or has raised a specified amount of money. 
• To qualify, a candidate must agree not to spend more than a specified amount of 
personal funds on their own campaign. The limit is $100,000 for mayoral candidates 
and $25,00o for City Council candidates. 
• To qualify, a candidate must agree to hold at least one scheduled debate with their 
opponent prior to the primary election and two debates prior to the general election. 
• Matching public funds are available to qualifying citywide candidates on a 1-1 ratio for 
each individual contribution of $500 or less raised within one year prior to the 
election. City Council candidates may receive matching funds for individual 
contributions up to $250. 
• The amount of public funding a candidate may receive depends on the office being 
sought. Candidates for mayor may receive up to $667,000 for the primary and 
$800,00 for the run-off election, while City Council candidates may receive a 
maximum of$100,000 in the primary election and $125,000 in the run-off. 
• $2 million from the Los Angeles City General Fund is appropriated annually to a 
Matching Funds Trust Fund to finance this matching funds program. 
Los Angeles has only held one citywide election under Measure Hs provisions. Of the 
119 candidates on the April 1993 primary ballot, only 28 received matching funds (totaling 
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$3.3 million.) Of the ten candidates in run-off elections, nine received matching funds 
(totaling $1.4 million.) Participation was clearly better in the run-off election. Still, 
Benjamin Bycel, Executive Director of the Los Angeles Ethics Commission, concluded 
that "the program increased the ability of challengers to compete."152 While incumbents 
outspent their challengers by a 10 to 1 margin in 1989, and a 20 to 1 margin in 1991, 
incumbents outspent their challengers by just 3 to I in 1993 (under Measure H). More 
importantly, average spending by challengers increased dramatically from approximately 
$15,000 in 1991 to nearly $70,000 in 1993. Qualifying primary candidates received at 
least 48 percent of their campaign funds from small individual contributors. When 
combined with public grants, these candidates received an average of 64 percent of their 
funds from those contributors or the city of Los Angeles.1.S3 
Aggregate campaign spending increased during the 1993 election cycle. This appears to 
be the result of the increased number of serious challengers, because average spending by 
incumbents decreased. The central challenge facing administrators of the Los Angeles 
campaign finance law is to encourage more candidates to participate in the program. 
New York, New York 
The New York City Council approved the Campaign Finance Act of 1988 to reduce "the 
influence of wealthy contributors on electoral campaigns and address the public perception 
that large contributions to candidates purchased special access to elected officials and 
purchased special privilege in the conduct of official business." 154 The ambitious Act also 
sought to increase participation by candidates and voters in more competitive elections. 
To accomplish these objectives, the City Council adopted a multifaceted approach to 
election reform. The reforms included: 
• A Campaign Finance Board responsible for administering and enforcing the campaign 
regulations and producing and distributing a non-partisan voter guide to all registered 
voters in the city. The guide, which is printed in numerous languages, has been hailed 
as a national voter education model. 
• An entirely voluntary comprehensive financing system. While most jurisdictions with 
comprehensive systems have voluntary expenditure limits in exchange for public 
funding, all aspects of the New York City system are voluntarily accepted in exchange 
for public funding. Candidates not accepting public money, are subject to much less 
stringent state laws governing contribution limits and disclosure. 
• Disclosure provisions include a computerized Campaign Finance Information System 
that compiles detailed information from candidates' disclosure reports in an easily 
accessible format. 
The Act was amended in 1992, and now contains a blend of voluntary contribution limits, 
expenditure limits, and partial public funding for city elections. 
152 Benjamin Bycel testimony, Senate Committee on Elections and Reapportionment. October 28, 1993. 
1S3 City ofLos Angeles Ethic Commission. 1994. 
154 New York City Campaign Finance Board "Dollars and Disclosure", 1990. 
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Contribution Limits: 
• All participating candidates for citywide elected office are prohibited from soliciting or 
accepting contributions in excess of $6,500 for the primary and general election 
combined. Contributions to participating candidates for Borough President are limited 
to $5,000, while contributions to participating City Council candidates are capped at 
$3,000 per campaign cycle. 
• Non-participating candidates may not accept contributions in excess of the levels 
permitted by state law: $100,000 per election cycle for citywide candidates and $7,900 
for City Council candidates. 
Voluntary Expenditure Limits: 
Candidates voluntarily accepting spending limits in exchange for matching funds are 
restricted to the following spending levels: 
• Mayoral candidates- $4 million on the primary election and $4 million on the general 
election. 
• Candidates for Comptroller and Public Advocate- $2.5 million on each of the primary 
and general elections. 
• Candidates for Borough President- $900,000 for each election 
• City Council candidates- $105,000 for each election. 
Public Financing: 
To qualify for public funds, candidates must agree to abide by the contribution and 
expenditure limits, be opposed on the ballot, file extensive disclosure statements, and meet 
the following threshold levels: 
• Mayoral candidates must collect $250,000 in contributions from 1,000 New York City 
residents; 
• Comptroller and Public Advocate candidates must receive $125,000 in contributions 
from 500 city residents; 
• Candidates for Borough President must raise between $10,000 and $50,000, 
depending on census figures, from 100 borough residents. 
• City Council candidates must raise $5,000 from 50 contributions residing within their 
district. 
• All threshold contributions are subject to the contribution limits. 
Qualifying candidates receive matching funds on a 1-1 ratio for each individual 
contribution of $1,000 or less. Candidates facing a high spending non-participant receive 
matching funds at a rate of 2 to 1. City Council candidates may receive a maximum of 
$40,000 per election (38 percent of the applicable spending limit). All other candidates 
are limited to a maximum of half of the applicable spending limit from public sources. 
CRB-IS-006 
July 1994 
Page D17 
Following the 1989 elections, the New York Campaign Finance Program received a great 
deal of praise. The New York Times called the program "An Electoral Example for the 
Country,"155 and numerous candidates, both winners and losers, credited the program with 
enabling them to run competitive campaigns based on community fundraising. Citywide 
elections were reportedly, "the most competitive in decades"l56 due to more equitable 
campaign spending levels. However, only half of the incumbents seeking re-election to the 
City Council agreed to participate in the program in 1989. 
The Campaign Finance Board subsequently offered a number of amendments to the 
program to facilitate its use in City Council races, including increasing public grants. 
While only 34 percent of Council candidates participated in 1989, approximately 57 
percent participated in 1991, and 86 percent of primary election candidates participated in 
1993 as well as 56 percent of general election candidates. Electoral competition has also 
been enhanced. In 1989, only one third of City Council incumbents faced primary election 
challengers. This figure increased to one half in 1991. Further, the contested elections 
resulted in closer vote margins. The New York City Campaign Finance Board found that 
the margin of votes was five percent closer between incumbents and participating 
challengers than incumbents and non-participating challengers in the primary election and 
11 percent closer in the general election. During the 1993 election, the Board reports that 
78 percent of the victorious candidates participated in the comprehensive financing 
program. 157 
Public financing also had a dramatic effect on the source of campaign funds. In 1993, 
participants raised 53 percent of their funds from individuals and received an additional 17 
percent of their total funds in public matching funds. Corporations, political action 
committees, and other political committees accounted for less than 30 percent of the total 
sum raised by participating candidates.158 The Campaign Finance Board has proposed 
adjusting the program to further limit the role of wealthy contributors and special interests, 
including lowering contribution limits from $6,500 to $5,000 for citywide candidates. 
The central challenge facing the New York City program is to encourage greater 
participation in the voluntary program. While citywide candidates have consistently joined 
the program, partly to receive financial benefits and partly to appease the news media, City 
Council candidates have had low rates of participation. The Board has proposed a series 
of amendments to further enhance candidates participation, including lowering threshold 
levels, increasing spending limits by nearly 25 percent, and increasing the penalties non-
participation by providing greater benefits, such as 3 to 1 matching funds, to their 
participating opponents. 
m Ibid. 
1S6 Ibid. 
157 New York City Campaign Finance Board "Campaign Finance Program", 1993. 
ISS Ibid. 
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APPENDIX E: ADJUSTED CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE CAMPAIGN 
EXPENDITURES 1980-1992 
Amount Spent by State Legislative Candidates 
Adjusted for Inflation, Per Capita 1980-1992 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
Amount Spent by State Legislative Candidates 
Adjusted for Inflation, Per Registered Voter 1980-1992 
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APPENDIX F: CAMPAIGN RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES: CALIFORNIA 
LEGISLATURE 1976-1992 
1992 General Election 
Receipts 
$31 million (total for all candidates) 
$4.17 million Senate 
$26.01 million Assembly 
Expenditures 
$34 million (total for all candidates) 
Exact figures not available 
Exact figures not available 
1992 Primary Election 
Receipts 
$42 million (total for all candidates) 
$9.77 million Senate 
$32.04 million Assembly 
Expenditures 
$38 million (total for all candidates) 
Exact figures not available 
Exact figures not available 
1990 General Election 
Receipts 
$56 million (total for all candidates) 
$4.51 million Senate 
$12.71 million Assembly 
$38.32 million Constitutional 
Expenditures 
$70 million (total for all candidates) 
$7.05 million Senate 
$16.90 million Assembly 
$46.40 million Constitutional 
1990 Primary Election 
Receipts 
$81 million (total for all candidates) 
$7.96 million Senate 
$26.81 million Assembly 
$46.29 million Constitutional 
Expenditures 
$72 million (total for all candidates) 
$6.45 million Senate 
$24.07 million Assembly 
$41.07 million Constitutional 
1988 General Election 
Receipts 
$33 million (total for all candidates) 
$8.38 million Senate 
$24.71 million Assembly 
Expenditures 
$40 million (total for all candidates) 
$9.88 million Senate 
$30.33 million Assembly 
1988 Primary Election 
Receipts 
$43 million (total for all candidates) 
$12.18 million Senate 
$31.32 million Assembly 
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Expenditures 
$36 million (total for all candidates) 
$10.38 million Senate 
$25.54 million Assembly 
Page Fl 
1986 General Election 
Receipts 
$47 million (total for all candidates) 
$10.48 million Senate 
$15.14 million Assembly 
$21.03 million Constitutional 
Expenditures 
$59 million (total for all candidates) 
$12.10 million Senate 
$18.32 million Assembly 
$28.19 million Constitutional 
1986 Primary Election 
Receipts 
$59 million (total for all candidates) 
$8.38 million Senate 
$22.66 million Assembly 
$27.86 million Constitutional 
Expenditures 
$47 million (total for all candidates) 
$6.45 million Senate 
$20.10 million Assembly 
, $20.81 million Constitutional 
1984 General Election 
Receipts 
$22 million (total for all candidates) 
$7.29 million Senate 
$14.73 million Assembly 
Expenditures 
$24 million (total for all candidates) 
$8.04 million Senate 
$16.22 million Assembly 
1984 Primary Election 
Receipts 
$28 million (total for all candidates) 
$7.76 million Senate 
$19.84 million Assembly 
Expenditures 
$21 million (total for all candidates) 
$6.03 million Senate 
$14.53 million Assembly 
1982 General Election 
Receipts 
$40 million (total for all candidates) 
$6.24 million Senate 
$15.79 million Assembly 
$18.22 million Constitutional 
Expenditures 
$43 million (total for all candidates)) 
$6.92 million Senate 
$17.38 million Assembly 
$18.64 million Constitutional 
1982 Primary Election 
Receipts 
$45 million (total for all candidates) 
$5.99 million Senate 
$17.7 5 million Assembly 
$22.39 million Constitutional 
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Expenditures 
$40 million (total for all candidates) 
$5.01 million Senate 
$14.69 million Assembly 
$21.88 million Constitutional 
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1980 General Election 
Receipts 
$17 million (total for all candidates) 
$3.79 million Senate 
$12.86 million Assembly 
Expenditures 
$18 million (total for all candidates) 
$3.88 million Senate 
$13.72 million Assembly 
1980 Primary Election 
Receipts 
$19 million (total for all candidates) 
$4.32 million Senate 
$14.72 million Assembly 
Expenditures 
$17 million (total for all candidates) 
$3.61 million Senate 
$13.13 million Assembly 
1978 General Election 
Receipts 
$21 million (total for all candidates) 
$3.09 million Senate 
$7.07 million Assembly 
$11.22 million Constitutional 
Expenditures 
$22 million (total for all candidates) 
$3 .13 million Senate 
$7.49 million Assembly 
$11.10 million Constitutional 
1978 Primary Election 
Receipts 
$24 million (total for all candidates) 
$2.75 million Senate 
$8.45 million Assembly 
$12.56 million Constitutional 
Expenditures 
$22 million (total for all candidates) 
$2.32 million Senate 
$7.34 million Assembly 
$12.41 million Constitutional 
1976 General Election 
Receipts 
$7 million (total for all candidates) 
$2.29 million Senate 
$5.07 million Assembly 
Expenditures 
$8 million (total for all candidates) 
$2.59 million Senate 
$5.10 million Assembly 
1976 Primary Election 
Receipts 
$9 million (total for all candidates) 
$2.58 million Senate 
$5.98 million Assembly 
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Expenditures 
$7 million (total for all candidates) 
$2.17 million Senate 
$4.89 million Assembly 
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APPENDIX G: CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: 
California Legislature 1991-1992 
TOTAL LEGISLATURE 
Individuals 
PACs, Business, and Labor 
Party and Transfers 
Family 
NON-INCUMBENTS (251) 
Individuals 
P ACs, Business, and Labor 
Party and Transfers 
Family 
INCUMBENTS (82) 
Individuals 
P ACs, Business, and Labor 
Party and Transfers 
Family 
INDIVIDUAL MONEY 
Incumbents (82) 
Non-Incumbents (251) 
PAC MONEY 
Incumbents (82) 
Non-Incumbents (251) 
PARTY MONEY 
Incumbents (82) 
Non-Incumbents (251) 
FAMILY MONEY 
Incumbents (82) 
Non-Incumbents (251) 
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AMOUNT 
$79,890,679 
$13,976,490 
$48,047,943 
$12,362,483 
$5,503,763 
$25,793,034 
$5,851,106 
$9,722,506 
$5,961,380 
$4,258,042 
$54,097,645 
$8,125,384 
$38,325,437 
$6,401,103 
$1,245,721 
$13,976,490 
$8,125,384 
$5,851,106 
$48,047,943 
$38,325,437 
$9,722,506 
$12,362,483 
$6,401,103 
$5,961,380 
$5,503,763 
$1,245,721 
$4,258,042 
NUMBER 
81,108 
42,431 
37,565 
873 
238 
30,066 
20,217 
9,130 
510 
209 
51,042 
22,214 
28,436 
363 
29 
42,348 
20,217 
22,214 
37,565 
28,436 
9,130 
873 
363 
510 
238 
29 
209 
AVERAGE 
$984 
$329 
$1,279 
$14,161 
$23,125 
$858 
$289 
$1,065 
$11,689 
$20,373 
$1,060 
$366 
$1,348 
$17,634 
$42,956 
$330 
$366 
$289 
$1,279 
$1,348 
$1,065 
$14,161 
$17,634 
$11,689 
$23,125 
$42,956 
$20,373 
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California State Senate 1991-1992 
TOTAL SENATE 
Individuals 
P ACs, Business, and Labor 
Party and Transfers 
Family 
NON-INCUMBENTS (25) 
Individuals 
P ACs, Business, and Labor 
Party and Transfers 
Family 
INCUMBENTS (23) 
Individuals 
P ACs, Business, and Labor 
Party and Transfers 
Family 
INDIVIDUAL MONEY 
Incumbents (23) 
Non-Incumbents (25) 
PAC MONEY 
Incumbents (23) 
Non-Incumbents (25) 
PARTY MONEY 
Incumbents (23) 
Non-Incumbents (25) 
FAMILY MONEY 
Incumbents (23) 
Non-Incumbents (25) 
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Amount 
$22,884,746 
$3,628,953 
$14,980,282 
$2,361,896 
$1,913,615 
$2,542,688 
$595,673 
$527,335 
$380,240 
$1,039,440 
$20,342,058 
$3,033,280 
$14,452,947 
$1,981,656 
$874,175 
$3,628,953 
$3,033,280 
$595,673 
$14,980,282 
$14,452,947 
$527,335 
$2,361,896 
$1,981,656 
. $380,240 
$1,913,615 
$874,175 
$1,039,440 
Number Average 
21,483 $1,065 
9,781 $371 
11,534 $1,299 
139 $16,992 
29 $65,987 
2,180 $1,166 
1,695 $351 
438 $1,204 
24 $15,843 
23 $45,193 
19,303 $1,034 
8,086 $375 
11,096 $1,303 
115 $17,232 
6 $145,696 
9,781 $371 
8,086 $375 
1,695 $351 
11,534 $1,299 
ll,096 $1,303 
438 $1,204 
139 $16,992 
115 $17,232 
24 $15,843 
29 $65,987 
6 $145,696 
23 $45,193 
Median 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
$125 
$500 
$1,025 
$3,025 
$200 
$600 
$5,000 
$28,500 
$200 
$125 
$600 
$500 
$5,000 
$1,025 
$28,500 
$3,025 
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California State Assembly 1991-1992 
TOTAL ASSEMBLY 
Individuals 
P ACs, Business, and Labor 
Party and Transfers 
Family 
NON-INCUMBENTS (226) 
Individuals 
PACs, Business, and Labor 
Party and Transfers 
Family 
INCUMBENTS (59) 
Individuals 
P ACs, Business, and Labor 
Party and Transfers 
Family 
INDIVIDUAL MONEY 
Incumbents (59) 
Non-Incumbents (226) 
PAC MONEY 
Incumbents (59) 
Non-Incumbents (226) 
PARTY MONEY 
Incumbents (59) 
Non-Incumbents (226) 
F AMll.. Y MONEY 
Incumbents (59) 
Non-Incumbents (226) 
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Amount 
$57,005,933 
$10,347,537 
$33,067,661 
$10,000,587 
$3,590,148 
$23,250,346 
$5,255,433 
$9,195,171 
$5,581,140 
$3,218,602 
$33,755,587 
$5,092,104 
$23,872,490 
$4,419,447 
$371,546 
$10,347,537 
$5,092,104 
$5,255,433 
$33,067,661 
$23,872,490 
$9,195,171 
$10,000,587 
$4,419,447 
$5,581,140 
$3,590,148 
$371,546 
$3,218,602 
Number Average 
59,625 $956 
32,650 $317 
26,032 $1,270 
734 $13,625 
209 $17,178 
27,886 $833 
18,522 $284 
8,692 $1,058 
486 $11,484 
186 $17,304 
31,739 $1,063 
14,128 $360 
17,340 $1,377 
248 $17,820 
23 $16,154 
32,650 $317 
14,128 $360 
18,522 $284 
26,032 $1,270 
17,340 $1,377 
8,692 $1,058 
734 $13,625 
248 $17,820 
486 $11,484 
209 $17,178 
23 $16,154 
186 $17,304 
Median 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
$150 
$500 
$1,223 
$5,804 
$200 
$500 
$3,000 
$2,730 
$200 
$150 
$500 
$500 
$3,000 
$1,223 
$2,730 
$5,804 
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